State of Utah v. Nelson Rodriguez-Lopi : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
State of Utah v. Nelson Rodriguez-Lopi : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Catherine E. Lilly; Ralph W. Dellapiana; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Kenneth Updegrove;
Deputy Salt Lake District attorney; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Rodriguez-Lopi, No. 960665 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/479
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 960665-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION 
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (COCAINE), A 
3RD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1996), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE J. 
DENNIS FREDERICK PRESIDING 
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
KENNETH UPDEGROVE 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 960665-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION 
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (COCAINE), A 
3RD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1996), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE J. 
DENNIS FREDERICK PRESIDING 
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
KENNETH UPDEGROVE 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
STOP OF DEFENDANT'S PICKUP WAS SUPPORTED BY 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 8 
II. THE PRELIMINARY HEARING MAGISTRATE'S BINDOMBR 
DETERMINATION IS WELL-SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD; 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL C 0 1 7 / PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
QUASH THE INFORMATION 15 
A. Liberal Bindover Standard 15 
B. Toxicology Reports Are Reliable Hearsay For Preliminary 
Hearing Purposes 16 
C. Even Excluding the Toxicology Report, the Officers' 
Experienced Observations and Defendant's Admission 
Abundantly Support the Bindover Determination 23 
CONCLUSION 26 
1 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Preliminary Hearing Transcript 
Addendum B - Motion to Suppress Evidence and Motion to Quash Bindover 
Addendum C - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Addendum D - Constitutional, Statutory and Rule Provisions 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 7 
United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20 (2nd Cir. 1983) 21 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 8,9 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) 9 
United States v. DeWater, 846 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1988) 19 
United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1988) 21 
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2nd Cir.1977) 20 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) 8 
STATE CASES 
Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah App. 1987) 20,21 
Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1990) 20 
Provo City Corporation v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1993) 24 
Sandy City, v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1989) 13 
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980) 22 
State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983) 20 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981) 22 
State v. Carpena, 714P.2d674 (Utah 1986) 12 
••• 
m 
State v. Christian, 895 P.2d 676 (N.M. App. 1995), 
cert, denied, 892 P.2d 961 (N.M. 1995) 19,21 
State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989) 9,10,11,12,14 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1992) 25 
State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1991), 
cer/. tfenferf, 825 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992) 8 
State v. M?«te, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1990) 9 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 2 
State v. Ptetfger, 896 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1995) 1,2, 15,22, 23,25 
State v. Schnoor, 845 P.2d 947 (Utah App. 1993) 8 
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989) 11 
State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 1992) 17 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 2 
State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995) 3 
State v. Watts, 750P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988) 8 
Yacht Club v. £/ta/* Liquor Control Commission, 681 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1984) 17 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1993 and Supp. 1997) 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 (1993 and Supp. 1997) 20 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-45 (1993) 10 
UtahCodeAnn. §41-6-61(1993) 10 
iv 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-104 (1994) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 (1996) 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996) 1,2,24 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1995) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302 (1993) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1303 (1993) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304 (1993) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305 (Supp. 1996) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (1995) 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) 2 
Utah Const, art I, § 12 16 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7 16 
Utah R. Evid. 803 19 
Utah R. Evid. 1101 16 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case For and the Effects of 
Utahs Victims Rights Amendment, 4 Utah L. Rev. 1373,1442 n. 354 (1994) 17 
v 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI, : Case No. 960665-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
(cocaine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1996). 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to quash the 
bindover? 
A district court's refusal to quash the bindover is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1126,1229 (Utah 1995) (upholding refusal to quash bindover 
where evidence was not "wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove 
some issue which support's the prosecution's claim"). 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that the stop of defendant's 
pickup was supported by reasonable suspicion? 
A "bifurcated" appellate review standard applies to a trial court's 
reasonable suspicion determination: Underlying fact findings are reviewed deferentially, 
and reversed only for "clear error." The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, with a "measure of deference" accorded to highly fact-sensitive conclusions. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1265-71 
(Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions are 
contained in addendum D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1996); carrying a 
loaded firearm in a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-505 (1995); and open container in a motor vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 (1993) (R. 8). Defendant subsequently entered 
a conditional guilty plea to the possession charge (R. 97-104), and the remaining charges 
were dismissed pursuant to the parties' plea agreement (R. 107). The trial court imposed 
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a zero-to-five year term, which term was suspended and defendant was placed on an 18 
month term of probation (id). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State recites the facts in a light supporting the trial court's rulings. See, 
e.g., State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182,1186 (Utah 1995). A copy of the trial court's written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached as addendum C. 
Traffic Violations and Prostitution. Salt Lake City Police Officers Schow 
and Farris were patrolling State Street, in the vicinity of 1500 South, in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, in the early morning hours of 19 May 1996, when they observed a pickup truck 
traveling north in the parking lane (R. 158-159,175). The officers estimated that the 
pickup was traveling 10 m.p.h. or slower in a 35 m.p.h. zone (id.). Defendant, who was 
driving the pickup, was leaned over, looking toward two known prostitutes, to the extent 
that his head was in the passenger area of the pickup (R. 159). Defendant's passenger 
hung out the passenger side window talking to the prostitutes as they walked slowly 
northward on the adjacent sidewalk (R. 159-60,176). 
Open Container of Alcohol in a Motor Vehicle and Carrying a Loaded 
Firearm. Officer Schow activated the overhead lights on the patrol car to stop 
defendant's pickup (R. 176). The pickup continued on for at least one block before 
coming to a halt (id.). During that time period, the officers observed both defendant and 
his passenger "frantically" attempting to hide something under the seat (R. 121 (see 
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addendum C) 160,176). Once the pickup stopped, Officer Schow approached 
defendant's side, and Officer Farris approached the passenger side of the pickup (R. 161). 
Upon reaching the pickup, and being concerned for the officers' safety, Officer Schow 
asked defendant to step out (R. 177). As defendant did so, both officers spied an open 
bottle of beer on the middle of the floorboard area (R. 161,177). Officer Farris then 
asked the passenger to step out also (R„ 170). 
Officer Schow and Officer Findlay, who had arrived to assist at this time, 
watched defendant and his passenger while Officer Farris walked to the driver's side of 
the pickup where he found a loaded Ruger .357 Pistol laying on the floorboard directly 
under the driver's seat (R. 162). Upon finding the gun, Officer Farris ordered defendant 
to put his hands up, which order defendant ignored (R. 178). Officer Farris grabbed 
defendant's arm and took him to the ground in order to handcuff him (R. 163,178). Both 
suspects were arrested for carrying a loaded weapon and for the open container violation 
(R. 171). 
Cocaine Possession. After defendant was put to the ground and 
handcuffed, Officer Findlay observed a baggie filled with a white powdery substance that 
was sticking out from defendant's front shirt pocket (R. 186-87). Officer Findlay asked: 
"So, what's this?" (id). Defendant replied that it was "cocanini," meaning cocaine (id). 
Preliminary Hearing. Defendant's statement and the toxicology report 
identifying the white powder as cocaine (R. 70), together with Officer Schow's 
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observation that based on his training and experience, the white powder was consistent 
with cocaine, were all admitted at the preliminary hearing (R. 62-63, a copy of 
preliminary hearing transcript is contained in addendum A). 
Defendant challenged the admission of the toxicology report, complaining 
that it constituted inadmissible hearsay, and that the State had presented inadequate 
foundation to establish the chain of custody and the qualifications of the chemist 
conducting the drug tests (R. 51). Defendant further claimed that admission of the 
toxicology report denied his right of cross examination (id.). 
Bindover. The preliminary hearing magistrate rejected defendant's 
arguments, observing that "the constitution was amended to permit this kind of evidence 
at preliminary hearing at least[.]" (R. 70). The preliminary hearing court also rejected 
defendant's foundational objections to the toxicology report, based on Officer's Schow's 
testimony that he had observed another officer "book" the evidence (R. 69), and on the 
fact that the toxicology report reflected the name of another officer who transported the 
evidence to the state crime lab (R. 70). Therefore, based on the officers' observations of 
the white powdery substance retrieved from defendant's person, which was also packaged 
in a baggie, appeared consistent with a narcotic substance, the toxicology report 
indicating the white powdery substance was cocaine, and defendant's own admission that 
the substance was cocaine, the magistrate determined to bind defendant over for trial (R. 
71). 
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Motions to Quash and to Suppress. Defendant filed a motion to quash the 
bindover arguing that the toxicology report was inadmissible, and that without the report, 
the evidence was insufficient for bindover on the drug possession charge (R. 24, a copy of 
the motion is contained in addendum B). The parties submitted the issue based on the 
preliminary hearing transcript (R. 180). 
Defendant also filed motions to suppress his statement and the physical 
evidence seized pursuant to the warrantless seizure and search of vehicle and person (R. 
22, 75, 77, 79, a copy of defendant's motion challenging the seizure of his vehicle (R. 
75), is contained in addendum B). 
District Court Rulings. In a consolidated ruling, the district court denied 
defendant's quashal motion, concluding that: "The Magistrate at the preliminary hearing 
properly admitted the Utah Crime Laboratory toxicology report as reliable hearsay[,]" and 
that the bindover was therefore proper (R. 122, see addendum C). 
The district court also denied defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine 
seized, concluding that police properly stopped defendant's pickup based on their 
observation of a "traffic offense," and that in light of the "totality of the circumstances, 
police also had "reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that a public offense was 
being committed and that defendant would leave the scene" (R. 123, see addendum C). 
The district court further concluded that the loaded firearm, open beer can and baggie 
containing a suspected controlled substance were 'Validly seized because they were in 
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plain view" and the officers' were "lawfully present" (id). The district court additionally 
concluded that the baggie was also properly seized as incident to defendant's arrest (id.). 
Finally, the district court granted defendant's motion to suppress his 
admission, concluding that it had been obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966) (id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Police reasonably stopped defendant's pickup. Defendant's 
conduct in driving his pickup in the parking lane while hr and his passenger's attention 
was diverted from the roadway by two prostitutes walking alongside the pickup provided 
police with at least reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense. Moreover, pv*;ce are entitled 
to assess facts in light of their experience. Given the 5:00 a.m. hour, the Si*..* Street 
locale and defendant's and his passenger's obvious interest in the two prostitutes, police 
were also entitled to stop defendant's pickup to investigate suspected prostitution activity. 
Defendant does not otherwise challenge the propriety of the subsequent 
seizure of contraband from his pickup and person. 
Point II. Evidence adduced at preliminary hearing must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution. Here, the only issue in dispute is whether the 
white powdery substance seized from defendant's person was a controlled substance. To 
that end, the State introduced a toxicology report indicating the substance was cocaine. 
Toxicology reports are considered reliable hearsay for preliminary hearing purposes. 
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However, even setting the toxicology report aside, the bindover is abundantly supported 
by the officers' experienced observations, and by defendant's own admission that the 
powder was cocaine. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED 
THAT THE STOP OF DEFENDANT'S PICKUP WAS 
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION1 
The trial court's reasonable suspicion determination should be upheld. 
There is reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop if, from the facts and the 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, police would reasonably suspect that criminal 
activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 
667 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 825 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992). Accordingly, the 
reasonable suspicion standard is "less demanding" than probable cause, requiring only 
"'some minimal level of objective justification'" for the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 
1
 Defendant's challenge to the trial court's reasonable suspicion 
determination is based on interpretative fourth amendment case law, with only nominal 
reference to the state constitution. Br. of Aplt. at 10. Because defendant advocates no 
different approach under the state constitution than existing Fourth Amendment law, the 
State's merit's analysis proceeds solely under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Watts, 
750 P.2d 1219,1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) (state and federal constitutional search and seizure 
provisions are nearly verbatim and should be construed similarly except possibly to 
protect state constitutional law from the "vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given the 
fourth amendment by federal courts"). See also State v. Schnoor, 845 P.2d 947,950 
(Utah App. 1993) (rejecting defendant's state constitutional claim for failure to offer a 
separate analysis, or to claim any broader protection). 
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490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and quotations omitted). Accord State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 
537, 541 (Utah App. 1990) (reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective facts 
suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal activity"). In evaluating this 
minimal objective justification, a court must consider "the totality of the circumstances -
the whole picture." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981). As the Supreme 
Court notes: 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with 
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain 
common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as 
factfinders are permitted to do the same — and so are law 
enforcement officers. 
Id at 418. 
Under these established principals, a stop based on reasonable suspicion 
may serve not merely to seize criminals, but also to dispel suspicion and prevent criminal 
activity. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (limited detentions supported by interest in 
"effective crime prevention and detection"); State v. Holmes, 114 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 
App. 1989) (same). Consequently, there remains the very real chance that many such 
stops will reveal no criminality. That possibility, however, does not preclude police from 
investigating facts that would warrant a person of "reasonable caution" in taking action. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. See also Menke, 787 P.2d at 540-41 (recognizing police "duty to 
make observations and investigations to determine whether the law is being violated"); 
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Holmes, 11A P.2d at 508 (same). Moreover, police are "'entitled to assess the facts in 
light of their experience.'" Holmes, 11A P.2d at 508 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, All U.S. 873, 885 (1975)). 
Here, the record establishes an objective justification for the stop of 
defendant's pickup. Officers Schow and Farris reasonably suspected several distinct 
violations. As found by the trial court, defendant's pickup "was being driven off the 
roadway near the curb and was proceeding at 10 m.pJh. in a 35 m.p.h. zone" (R. 121, see 
addendum C). Defendant, who was driving, was looking toward the two prostitutes on 
the sidewalk, and was so far leaned over in their direction that his head was in the 
passenger area (R. 159). Driving in this unsafe manner, in the parking area adjacent 
northbound State Street, is a valid basis for a traffic stop. The officers' reasonably 
suspected a possible violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61 (1) (1993) (requiring vehicles 
to be "operated as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane"), and/or Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-45 (1993) (proscribing reckless driving). 
Defendant asserts that driving in the parking zone adjacent to State Street 
does not constitute a traffic offense in violation of section 41-6-61(1) because "the area 
did not bear any markings indicating the dividing line between the driving lane and 
'parking area'". Br. of Aplt. at 12 n.l. The trial court rejected defendant's reasoning 
below, dryly observing that there were also no signs on the sidewalk stating: "For 
walking only" (R. 166-67). 
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Additionally, as found by the trial court, the two prostitutes to whom 
defendant's attention was drawn on the sidewalk were "known prostitutes" (R. 121, see 
addendum B). Defendant characterizes the officers' knowledge as "second hand", Br. of 
Aplt. at 15-16; however, the trial court's finding is supported by the record. Indeed, 
Officer Farris recognized the prostitutes as having been previously arrested for 
prostitution, and had recently investigated the prostitution activities of these same 
prostitutes and their "pimp" (R. 168). Given the 5:00 a.m. hour, the State Street locale, 
see, e.g., Holmes, 11A P.2d at 509 (recognizing State Street as "an area know for 
prostitution activity"); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah App. 1989) (same), and 
defendant and his passenger's obvious interest in the prostitutes, police reasonably 
suspected a prostitution violation. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302 (1993) 
(proscribing engaging in sexual activity with another person for a fee); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1303 (1993) (proscribing offering or agreeing to pay another person a fee for the 
purpose of engaging in sexual activity); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304 (1993) 
(proscribing the solicitation of a person to patronize a prostitute and/or procuring or 
attempting to procure a prostitute for a patron); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305 (Supp. 
1996) (proscribing the exploitation of prostitution by encouraging, inducing or otherwise 
causing another to become or remain a prostitute and/or transporting a person with a 
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution). 
11 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the stop of defendant's pickup was 
based on objective facts indicating traffic and/or more serious criminal law violations. 
Officers Schow and Farris had a "duty" to investigate further to determine which, if any, 
of the above violations the suspects were attempting to commit. Holmes, 509 P.2d at 508. 
Utah's reasonable suspicion statute permits police to stop individuals who have 
committed, are committing, or are attempting to commit an offense. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-7-15 (1995). Thus, contrary to defendant's suggestion, Br. of Aplt at 12 n.l, there is 
no requirement that the suspected offenses be entirely completed in the officers' presence. 
As this Court emphasized in Holmes: 
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who 
lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable 
cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders . . . A brief stop 
of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or 
to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 
information may be most reasonable in light of the facts 
known to the officer at the time. 
774 P.2d at 508 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,145-56 (1972)). 
In arguing that the instant stop was unjustified, defendant views certain 
facts in isolation, focusing on the defendant's slow, curb side driving, arguing that these 
facts failed to justify the stop as incident to a traffic violation. Br. of Aplt. at 13. The 
cases relied upon by defendant are distinguishable here. In State v. Carpena, the vehicle 
stop was "based merely on the fact that a car with out-of-state license plates was moving 
slowly through a neighborhood late at night." 714 P.2d 674,675 (Utah 1986). Further, 
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police had observed no criminal or traffic offense, and had received no report of a 
burglary in the area that night. Id. Accordingly, the supreme court found no objective 
facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of a traffic or more serious violation. Id. 
Similarly, in Sandy City v. Thorsness, this Court invalidated a DUI stop 
based on Thorsness' slow travel in an authorized travel lane. 778 P.2d 1011,1012 (Utah 
App. 1989). The officer observed no reckless, erratic driving pattern suggesting 
Thorsness' lack of control. Id. at 1013. In the present case, however, considering the 
totality of the circumstances, defendant's slowness must be viewed together with the fact 
that he was driving next to the curb in the parking zone, an unauthorized travel lane. See 
Section 41-6-61(1). Moreover, defendant's attention was not on the direction he was 
driving the vehicle, but rather was concentrated on the "streetwalkers" adjacent to the 
pickup (R. 159). While these facts may not, like Thorsness, suggest a possible DUI, they 
are indicative of a lane violation, see section 41-6-61(1), and/or reckless driving, see 
section 41-6-45. 
Even assuming these facts do not give rise to at least a minimally objective 
and reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, the additional facts of the early morning 
hour, the State Street vicinity and, in particular, defendant's and his passenger's 
communication with the prostitutes, add up to reasonable suspicion of a prostitution 
offense. Indeed, defendant concedes that a "brief exchange transpired" between his 
passenger and the prostitutes. Br. of Aplt. at 15. Based on this concession, and the fact 
13 
that Officer Farris' recognized the two women as prostitutes, defendant's assertion that 
the incident was "innocuous", Br. of Aplt. at 16, is not well taken. 
Finally, in Holmes, this Court held the officers' suspicion of State Street 
prostitution was reasonable, based on the officers' observation of Holmes' "strolling," 
and "looking back towards traffic," conduct consistent with soliciting. 774 P.2d at 509. 
Defendant notes the absence of such evidence here. Br. of Aplt. at 16. Significantly, 
however, police in Holmes did not, as in this case, recognize Holmes as a known 
prostitute. Id. The only difference between Holmes and this case is that in Holmes police 
described the conduct of the suspected prostitute. Id. Here, police focused on the 
conduct of the suspected patrons: both men were leaning severely towards the prostitutes 
to the extent that defendant's head was in the passenger area and his passenger was 
hanging out the passenger side windowr (R. 159). As this Court observed in Holmes, 
"police suspected a prostitution deal in an area known for prostitution activity. The 
officers observed a particular type of behavior which was consistent not only with 
criminal activity, but also with the reputation of the area." As such, the officers' 
common-sense reasonable suspicion determination, approved by the trial court, should be 
upheld. 
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POINT n 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING MAGISTRATE'S 
BINDOVER DETERMINATION IS WELL-
SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD; THEREFORE, THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO QUASH 
THE INFORMATION 
A. Liberal Bindover Standard 
The trial court's refusal to quash the bindover should be upheld. The 
probable cause standard for criminal bindover requires only "a quantum of evidence 
sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the trier of fact." State v. Pledger, 896 
P.2d 1226,1229 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980)). 
It is not, therefore, the equivalent of the reasonable doubt standard applicable in a 
criminal trial, nor even the preponderance standard applicable in civil cases. Id. Pledger 
instructs magistrates to view preliminary hearing evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution and to resolve all inferences in the prosecution's favor. 896 P.2d at 1229. 
This means that even "close calls" should result in a determination to bind over for trial. 
Id. at 1230. Indeed, it is presumed that prosecution evidence will only strengthen by time 
of trial. Id. at 1229 (quoting Diaz v. State, 728 P.2d 503, 510 (Okl. Cr. 1986)). 
Therefore, magistrates should bind criminal defendants over for trial "[u]nless the 
evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue 
which supports the [prosecution's] claim[.]" Id (quoting Cruz. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 
729 (Utah 1983) (setting out standard for directed verdict in civil cases)). 
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Having these principles in mind, the magistrate properly determined to bind 
defendant over on a charge of cocaine possession and the district court correctly upheld 
that bindover. The probable cause determination is supported by a toxicology report 
identifying the substance seized from defendant's person as cocaine, as well as Officer's 
Schow's experienced observation that the substance was consistent with cocaine, and 
defendant's admission that the substance was cocaine. 
B. Toxicology Reports Are Reliable Hearsay For Preliminary 
Hearing Purposes 
The state constitution, rules of evidence, and the rules of criminal procedure 
have all recently been amended to allow for the admission of reliable hearsay at 
preliminary hearings. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 ("[n]othing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause"); Utah R. Evid. 1101(5y 
("In a preliminary examination, nothing in these rules shall be construed to prevent the 
admission of reliable hearsay evidence."); Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2) (providing that 
preliminary hearing magistrate's probable cause determination "may be based on hearsay 
in whole or in part"). Additionally, the legislature enacted the Crime Victim's Act which 
defines "Reliable information"as "information worthy of confidence, including any 
information whose use at sentencing is permitted by the United States Constitution." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(4) (1995). "Hearsay evidence is freely permitted by the 
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United States Constitution at sentencing." Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of 
Justice: The Case For and the Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 4 Utah L. 
Rev. 1373,1442 n. 354 (1994). Based on these constitutional and rule changes, and the 
passage of the Crime Victim's Act, the Utah Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on 
Evidence decided against adopting a rule specifying that drug test reports are reliable 
hearsay for preliminary hearing purposes, reasoning that amended rule 1101 and section 
77-38-2(4) already ensured their admissibility. Id. at 1448-49 n. 384 (citing Utah 
Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Evidence, Meeting Minutes (Feb. 15,1995) (Tape 
1)). See also State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App. 1992) (reviewing rule 1101 
in the context of a restitution hearing and recognizing that rule 1101 is intended to 
"loosen the formality"of hearings, and "not to prevent the hearing of evidence. If 
anything, more evidence should be allowed under rule 1101, not less."). 
Significantly, even prior to the above constitutional, rule and statutory 
clarifications, the Utah Supreme Court deemed toxicology reports to be admissible 
hearsay for administrative hearing purposes, where, similar to preliminary hearings, "the 
technical rules of evidence do not apply." Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, 681 P.2d 1224,1226-27 (Utah 1984). In Yacht Club, the Supreme Court 
upheld the admissibility of a toxicology report under former rule 63(15), Utah Rules of 
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Evidence, the public records exception to the hearsay rule.2 The Supreme Court found 
the toxicology report admissible based on its determination that the report had been 
prepared by the state chemist, a public official, and that the making of the report fell 
within the state chemist's duties. Id. at 1227. 
Like its former counterpart, rule 803(8), Utah Rules of Evidence makes 
admissible "[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public 
offices or agencies, setting forth . . . matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as 
to which matters there was a duty to reportf.]" The toxicology report at issue here is the 
product of a public office or agency, the Department of Public Safety. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-5-104(5)-(6) (1994). Moreover, it sets forth a matter observed pursuant to duty 
imposed by law: Subsections (5) and (6) direct the Law Enforcement and Technical 
Services Division of the department to provide criminalistic laboratory services to 
prosecutors and public defenders, and to "analyze evidence from crime scenes and crime-
related incidents for criminal prosecution." 
2
 Rule 63(15) made admissible 
factual data contained in written reports or findings of fact 
made by a public official . . . if the judge finds that the 
making thereof was within the scope of the duty of such 
official and that it was his duty (a) to perform the act reported, 
or (b) to observe the act, condition or event reported, or (c) to 
investigate the facts concerning the act, condition or event and 
to make findings or draw conclusions based on such 
investigation... 
18 
Defendant notes that rule 803(8)(B), excludes "in criminal cases matters 
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel[.]" Utah R. Evid. 
803(8). Therefore, defendant argues, the toxicology report is inadmissible. Br, of Aplt. at 
30-32. At least one state court reviewing the rule 803(8)(B) exclusion has determined 
that it is aimed at police reports containing subjective commentary as to matters observed 
in the course of a fluid criminal investigation to which the officer should testify. State v. 
Christian, 895 P.2d 676, 682 (N.M. App. 1995), cert denied, 892 P.2d 961 (N.M. 1995). 
State crime laboratory reports do not fall into this category of police report. Rather, 
unlike the typically subjective police report, crime laboratory reports generally follow a 
routine manner of preparation. Christian, 895 P.2d at 682. Precisely because they are 
made as part of the everyday function of the lab, 44the factors likely to cloud the 
perception of an official engaged in the more traditional law enforcement functions of 
observation and investigation of crime are simply not present." Id. (quoting United States 
v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190,1194 (5th Cir. 1985)). Indeed, 
jj Justification for the public records and reports exception is 
the assumption that a public official will perform his duty 
properly and the unlikelihood that he will remember details 
independently of the record. Further justification lies in the 
reliability factors underlying records of regularly conducted 
activities generally. 
United States v. DeWater, 846 F.2d 528,530 (9th Cir. 1988) (admitting intoxilyzer result 
for trial purposes, under public records and reports exception to hearsay rule). The Utah 
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Supreme Court has recognized that "[pjolice records of routine matters[,]" like fingerprint 
records, are admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, where 
proper foundation is laid. State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181,1184 (Utah 1983). 
The instant toxicology report is analogous to admissible fingerprint records, 
and not to inadmissible police reports. Indeed, the toxicology report is factual, and is not 
in conflict: Defendant does not assert that the substance is anything other than cocaine. 
Consequently, the toxicology report is readily distinguishable from police reports 
containing subjective and non-routine information as to witnesses memory, perception, or 
motivation, which were deemed inadmissible, when offered by the state, in Bertul 664 
P.2d at 1184 (interpreting the former business and public records exceptions to the 
hearsay rule (Rule 63(13) & (15), Utah Rules of Evidence). Cf Layton City v. Peronek, 
803 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1990) (holding jail incident report indicating that defendant 
had reported to jail after consuming alcohol did not qualify as a record kept in the regular 
course of jail business under Utah R. Evid. 803(6), because the report did not grow out of 
routine practice but rather was ad hoc). 
Defendant cites two cases, United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 77 (2nd 
Cir.1977), and Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah App. 1987), both deeming 
drug and/or alcohol test results in admissible. In Oates, the Second Circuit held that a 
toxicology report was ineligible for the public records or any other exception to the 
hearsay rule because it included a factual finding resulting from a law enforcement 
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investigation. Oates' restrictive view has been criticized for the reasons stated 
previously: a toxicology result is the type of routine matter to which the public records 
exception to the hearsay rule typically applies. See United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 
1225,1229 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing cases rejecting Oates on ground that "exclusionary 
provision of Rule 803(8)(B) was only intended to apply to observations made by law 
enforcement officials at the scene of a crime or in investigating a crime, and not to reports 
of routine matters made in nonadversarial settings"); Christian, 895 P.2d at 680 
(recognizing that courts have limited Oates by excluding only those reports of police 
investigations containing adversarial and subjective commentary rather than routine 
objective observations). The Second Circuit itself confined Oates in United States v. 
Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20, 24-27 (2nd Cir. 1983), where it held that "Oates should not be 
extended to [exclude material admissible under] Rule 803(10)." Id. at 26. 
In Kehl, an appeal from an administrative suspension of Kehl's driver's 
license, this Court noted in dicta that if an intoxilyzer report were proffered by the State 
in a DUI prosecution, it would not be admissible under the public records exception of 
rule 803(8)(B). Notably, an intoxilyzer test, unlike a toxicology test, is typically run by 
the arresting officer at jail and constitutes part of the investigation in that refusal to take 
the test can result in license revocation. Kehl, 735 P.2d at 416; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.10(2)(a) (1993 and Supp. 1997). Therefore, an intoxilyzer result is more analogous to 
the police and jail incident reports deemed inadmissible in Bertid and Peronek than to the 
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toxicology report at issue here. In any event, the Kehl footnote is unanalyzed and 
contains no supporting authority, and, in light of the recent amendments to Utah's 
Constitution, and rules of evidence and criminal procedure, discussed at pp. 17-18, supra, 
its precedential weight, in this preliminary hearing context, is questionable. 
Finally, defendant relies on State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), 
for the proposition that the state and federal constitutional right of confrontation must be 
fully satisfied at preliminary hearings. Br. of Aplt at 32-36. Defendant's reliance on 
Anderson is misplaced for several reasons. First, the protections afforded criminal 
defendants by the federal Confrontation Clause do not extend to preliminary hearings. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1228 n.4 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)). Second, 
Anderson did not necessarily hold that the Utah confrontation clause, Article I, Section 
12, applies to preliminary hearings with the same force that it does to trials: the case 
contains no express statement to that effect. Third, two concurring justices wrote that 
they would not even reach the constitutional confrontation question in that case. 612 P.2d 
at 787-88 (concurring statements of Crockett, C.J., and Hall, J.). Fourth, not long after 
Anderson, the Supreme Court expressly stated: "[0]n the issue of defendant's right to 
confrontation, we hold that the Utah Constitutional provision, Article I, Section 12, 
should be construed the same as the Federal Constitutional provision..." State v. 
Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981). If the Supreme Court meant what it said in 
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Brooks, then it implicitly overruled Anderson, and adopted the federal view that 
confrontation rights do not apply at preliminary hearings. 
C. Even Excluding the Toxicology Report, the Officers' 
Experienced Observations and Defendant's Admission 
Abundantly Support the Bindover Determination 
However, the Court need not even reach any issue attending the 
admissibility of the toxicology report here because, even setting the toxicology report 
aside, the probable cause standard is met through both officers' experienced observations 
and defendant's admission that the substance seized from his person was in fact cocaine. 
In Pledger, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's refusal to quash 
the bindover of two counts of forcible sodomy. The critical issue in that case was 
whether the State had established sufficient evidence of the victim's age "to warrant 
submission of the case to the trier of fact." 896 P.2d at 1230 (quotation omitted). Under 
the pertinent statute, a victim under age eighteen could not lawfully consent to the 
charged misconduct. Noting that it was a close call, the Supreme Court nonetheless 
determined that the investigating officer's testimony that the victim appeared to be 
"approximately" fourteen years of age was sufficient for bindover. Id. The Supreme 
Court observed that it was unlikely that the officer would have mistakenly identified an 
eighteen-year-old boy as being fourteen. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court could not 
say that the evidence was "wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove 
some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim." Id. (quotation omitted). 
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Here, the drug statute under which defendant was charged makes it 
unlawful "for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1996). Defendant does not dispute that 
he possessed the substance seized from his person, but rather its narcotic character. Thus, 
the only issue in dispute is whether the seized white powder is cocaine, a controlled 
substance. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(i)(D) (1996) (listing cocaine as a 
controlled substance under schedule II). 
To that end, Officers Findlay and Schow both testified that they observed a 
white powdery substance in a baggie (R. 62-63,186-87). Officer Findlay actually 
retrieved the powder filled baggie from defendant's person and Officer Schow testified 
that based on his training and three and one/half years experience, the white powder was 
consistent with cocaine; although, Officer Schow admitted that occasionally, a substance 
he originally suspected to be cocaine was subsequently identified as sugar or baking soda 
(R. 62-64,186-87). Here, however, the officers' observations are buttressed by 
defendant's own admission that the substance was cocaine (R. 186-87). 
Defendant complains that his admission was admitted in violation of the 
corpus delicti rule. Br. of Aplt. at 38-39. Under the corpus delicti rule, a defendant's 
inculpatory statements cannot be introduced against the defendant at trial until the 
prosecution establishes the occurrence of a crime. Provo City Corporation v. Spotts, 861 
P.2d 437, 440 (Utah App. 1993). To the extent the corpus delicti rule may be applicable 
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at a preliminary hearing, it is met here. At the time defendant's admission was 
introduced, Officer Findlay had testified to his observation and seizure of a white 
powdery substance, packaged in a baggie, from defendant's person (R. 48-54). Although 
Officer Schow's testimony was introduced after defendant's admission, for purposes of 
review, the Court looks at the totality of the evidence adduced and the timing of its 
admission is inconsequential. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150,1163 (Utah 1992) 
(finding ample evidence for a foundation for the admissibility of inculpatory statements at 
trial, "even if not in the proper order"). The reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
officers' testimony are that the powdery substance, which was packaged in a manner 
common to narcotic substances, was a controlled substance and that it was possessed by 
defendant. The magistrate determined that for preliminary hearing purposes, Officer 
Findlay's testimony alone was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti and therefore to 
allow admission of defendant's inculpatory statement (R. 54). That ruling, and the 
district court's affirmance thereof, are consistent with the liberal bindover standard and 
should therefore be affirmed. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1228 (directing magistrate to 
resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, this Court should affirm the district court's rulings 
refusing to quash the bindover and admitting the seized cocaine. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
STATE OF UTAH 
v. 
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI 
Defense: Ralph Dellapiana 
Prosecutor: Ken Updegrove 
Judge: Robin W. Reese 
Swearing in of witnesses. 
Exclusionary rule invoked. 
Waived formal reading of information. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
1 Updegrove: Would you please state your name and spell your last name? 
2 A: Richard Findlay, F-l-N-D-L-A-Y. 
3 Q: For whom do you work with? 
4 A: Salt Lake City Corporation, as a police officer. 
5 Q: How long have you been a police officer? 
6 A: 2 years and 1 month, sir. 
7 Q: And what was your duties on May, what were your duties on May 19th of this year? 
8 A: I was assigned to the patrol division, the west patrol division, as a patrol officer. 
9 ' Q: And at approximately 0:500 on the 19th of May of this year, did you happen to be at 1525 
10 So. State Street in Salt Lake County? 
1 ! A: Yes I did. 
12 Q: (inaudible). 
13 A: I was Southbound on State Street, and I noticed that officer's Schow and Farris were conduaed 
14 a traffic stop, on the Northbound side, so I flipped around came to assist them. 
15 Q: And what did you do? 
16 A: I stood by and watched 2 occupants that were in a pickup truck, as Officer Farris began searching 
17 the driver's side of the pickup truck, and Officer Schow was on the passenger side of the truck. 
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1 Q: And did you, are one of the persons in the court. Do you see a person in die court room that 
2 was searched by Officer Farris and Officer Scow? 
3 A: The person at the defense table, in the white t-shirt. 
4 Updegrove: Your honor, may the record reflect the witness has identified the defendant? 
5 Judge: It will. 
6 Q: And ah, did you specifically observe the search of the defendant? 
7 A: I didn't observe the search, the detailed search, after he was arrested. After a gun was located 
8 in the pickup truck, both occupants of the truck were placed in handcuffs. I placed the passenger in 
9 handcuffs and the defendant for not obeying an order given by Officer Farris, was placed on the 
10 ground to be put in handcuffs, and as he was laying on the ground, I observed contents in his shirt 
11 pocket. 
12 Q: Would you please describe die contents in his shirt pocket? 
13 A: Yes sir it's a plasdc baggie that been partially exposed from him shirt pocket It was a button 
14 down style shirt, with a breast pocket, and the baggie was partially exposed. 
15 Q: What did you observe, if anything in the bag? 
16 A: There was a white powdery like substance in die bag. 
17 Q: Did you say anything to die defendant? 
18 A: I asked him what is that. 
19 Q: What was his response? 
20 Deliapiana: Ah, your honor, I'm gonna object, my grounds are that, I don't think a corpus delicti 
21 for possession of a controlled substance has been established at this point, and so I don't believe that 
22 the statement of the accused is admissible at this point 
23 Judge: Alright, counsel do you want to respond to that? 
24 Updegrove: Yes, your honor, he's identified the defendant as having a baggie of a white powdery 
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1 substance in his pocket. He asks him what this substance is, we have not gotten a response yet. 
2 Deiiapiana: That's my point. 
3 Judge: Just a minute, go ahead Mr. Updegrove. 
4 Updegrove: The response, if any objection we'd have, it would be after the response is in, there's 
5 no response in yet 
6 Judge: Well what he's saying though, is that the state has not established die crime of possession of 
7 a controlled substance, by independent means, that established a corpus of that crime by independent 
8 evidence, such that the confession could be as received. It's a rule of evidence, 
9 Updegrove: Well I be glad to withdraw the question. 
10 Judge: Okay, the question's withdrawn, you may proceed. 
11 Updegrove: Alright urn, do you have the case number on that particular case sir? 
12 A: I don't have it before me, no. 
13 Q: I'll approach, may I approach? 
14 Judge: Yes. 
15 Deiiapiana: What document are you showing to the witness? I'm not sure if this is the time to object 
16 but, I'm going to object that what he's going to show the witness is hearsay. This is not, this is not 
17 this officer's report. 
18 Judge: If he's hist attempting to refresh the officer's recollection though counsel, anything can be 
19 used to refresh his recollection. If he attempts to put into evidence hearsay statements of other 
20 officers, then 111 sustain your objections. 
21 Deiiapiana: Oh. 
22 Judge: For now though, die objections overruled, and you can approach the witness. 
23 Q: Thank you your honor. I'm handing you a police report, do you recognize that sir? 
24 A: Yes sir. 
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1 Q: What Is that police report? 
2 A: It's a initial report of the incident that occurred, 1525 South State, on that day. 
3 Q: Does it have a number? 
4 A: Yes sir it does. 
5 Q: May I approach the bench your honor? 
6 judge: Yes. 
7 Q: I'm handing you what's been marked as State's exhibit number 1, do you recognize what that 
8 is sir? 
9 A: Yes sir. 
10 Q: What is it? 
11 A: It looks like a toxicology report from the crime laboratory of the State of Utah. 
12 Q; Now on die second page, does it have a name? 
13 Dellapiana: Your honor, he's asking for him to read from die report, die report is hearsay, so die 
14 contents of it is still hearsay. He hasn't established that this officer is, had his memory that he ever 
15 had any personal knowledge of a particular number that was given this case, by a different officer. 
16 Judge: I understand counsel, although the officer is, you're right, he's not refreshing the officer's 
17 recollection, and simply reading the case number from the report would be hearsay, but for purposes 
18 of the preliminary hearing, I would be willing to find that it's reliable hearsay, and I would overrule 
19 the objection based on those grounds. 
20 Dellapiana: Okay Just for the record, my objection will be based on rule 803 (8)(B), indicating that 
21 information from law enforcement sources is excluded. 
22 Judge: I think you're right, a police report is not admissible into evidence, but I'm not sure that 
23 would Include, hist simply the case number itself. Ill note your objection, but it's overruled. 
24 Q: And what is the name on that particular (inaudible)? 
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1 A: On the toxicology report? 
2 Q: Yes. 
3 A: The name is, last name Rodriguez, first name Nelson. 
4 Q: And does that have a police number on it? 
5 A: Yes sir. 
6 Q: And does the police number match the police number on the report on this Incident in which 
7 you took part? 
8 A: Yes it does. 
9 Q: And for purposes of (inaudible) we would move to admit State's exhibit 1. 
10 Deliapiana: Objection, Judge, I mink the ah, I have a couple of different objections, first I believe 
11 that this document is hearsay, and again under rule 803 8b I think it's, it doesn't qualify as reliable 
12 hearsay under the article I section 12 of die State's Constitution, how there is no specific case law 
13 at this point here in Utah. There is a case in the 5th Qrcuit, United States versus Oates, which held 
14 back the report of the chemist of the U.S. Custom Service, was considered a, was used for the same 
15 purpose, to establish the nature of a controlled substance, the alleged controlled substance was was 
16 excluded by rule 803 (8)(B). I think this is a similar situation. I also have a problem with this report 
17 on foundational of the grounds. This officer I think, can't establish a chain of custody, first of all, 
18 between me substance, what's been found In my clients pocket, and the substance that was tested, 
19 allegedly tested by the toxicology lab. In addition, he can't establish that the test on State v. 
20 Rimmasch grounds, he can't establish the foundation for the introduction of the results of the test. 
21 He can't testify that the test was performed by a qualified person, that the underlying, the principles 
22 underlying the test, are inherently reliable, that the test was property performed on this specific 
23 occasion that result (inaudible). In addition, I think If I have a right to cross examine witnesses and 
24 In preliminary hearings, and this is denying me the opportunity to cross examine, the person making 
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1 the statement that's on hearsay In the report Also, I would object on confrontation clause grounds, 
2 which are separate from either Rules of Evidence or cross examination, under State v. Anderson, even 
3 though it's before the current or recent changes of the United States or the State Constitution. I 
4 believe that the, that its still applicable, but I don't have any case saying that the (inaudible) of cause 
5 no longer applies in Utah Courts, at preliminary hearings. The Supreme Court stated that it did. So 
6 those, on the grounds, i would object to the introduction of this document 
7 Judge: Okay, Mr. Updegrove, did you want to respond? 
8 Updegrove: Yes, very briefly your honor, I think this is exactly the type of information that, when 
9 the constitutional changed to allow reliable hearsay for preliminary hearings was meant for. it 
10 established, the name, Nelson Rodriguez, he also goes by Nelson Rodriguez-Lopi. It's the same police 
11 number, the report from the State's Crime Lab, I think that this is reliable hearsay (inaudible) and I 
12 believe that preliminary hearings, so far has always been allowed and it hasn't changed the 
13 constitution. 
14 Judge: Okay, just briefly Mr. Dellapiana. 
15 Dellapiana: Thank you judge, I think I stated my objection. 
16 Judge: You've probably said what you've needed. Alright on the, It looked to me like there were 
17 3 grounds, one the rights of due process that even though it may be an exception to the hearsay rule, 
18 that doesn't necessarily mean that the evidence is admitted that doesn't offend the notion of due 
19 process, i would deny the motion on that ground, and as well on the hearsay ground. It would seem 
20 to me that this sort of information is the kind of reliable hearsay that this amendment was intended 
21 to permit, in a court in preliminary hearing. The question I have Mr. Updegrove is just a foundation, 
22 I think Mr. Dellapfana's right Ail that I know at this point of the hearing is that when this officer saw 
23 someone else take the defendant to the ground, he saw something in his shirt pocket that looked like 
24 a baggie filled with white powder. I have no idea as to whether thk substance that was analyzed Is 
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1 in fact the contents of that baggie. I don't know whether the baggie was taken from his pocket and 
2 put into evidence. In fact, there's no connection at all between that baggie that I've heard evidence 
3 about and this substance mat was analyzed. So I think counsel's correct at this point, there isn't 
4 sufficient foundation, even though I wouldn't require you to present every link in the chain to and 
5 from the tox, I don't know what this tox report even relates to, so I'll sustain the objection at this 
6 point, based on that ground. 
7 Q: What happened to the baggie that was taken from the defendant's pocket? 
8 A: it was placed in evidence with the firearm that was taken out of the car. 
9 Q: And what normally happens with substances (inaudible)? 
10 Dellapiana; Relevance. 
11 Judge: Well it's clearly relevant. Did you place this in evidence officer? 
12 A: No sir, I did not. 
13 Judge: Is the officer here that did counsel? 
14 Updegrove: Which officer did that? 
15 A: I believe it was officer Farris. 
16 Updegrove: Officer Farris Is not here your honor. 
17 Judge: Do you know whether mat officer even put it into evidence, do you have any idea, other than 
18 what he may have told you? 
19 A: The evidence report on the police report, state's that the items placed In evidence were firearm, 
20 and baggie with white powder. 
21 Judge; I think counsel, you're probably stuck, at least without that basic foundation being iaid, 
22 someone took ft from the person of the defendant, put it into evidence, at least that part of it has 
23 to be here. 
24 Updegrove: Well let me go back to the one thing I was stuck at previously. 
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1 Judge: Alright, I'll sustain the objection. 
2 Q: I'll ask the question, when you asked the defendant, what was in that bag, what was his response? 
3 Deliapiana: And i sdli have the same objection at this point, there hasn't been competent evidence 
4 to prove the corpus. 
5 Judge: 111 overrule the objection on the ground counsel, the officer having seen the baggie and the 
6 white powdery substance. Although It doesn't prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in 
7 possession of a controlled substance, it establishes In my judgement sufficient corpus to permit the 
8 defendant's response. 
9 Deliapiana; Your honor, if I could on convincing evidence, I think that's the standard, which is a 
10 higher standard than for, that is necessary to bind over a case. I believe that die corpus, and I'm not 
11 sure that that applies in die same way at preliminary hearings as does other occasions, but I'm gonna 
12 argue that it does. 
13 Judge: I will rule that the corpus delicti rule Is the same, It's rule of evidence so, I understand your 
14 objection, but 111 overrule it, it seems to me mat sufficient corpus has been established. You can 
15 answer. 
16 Q: And what was his response to you concerning the contents of the baggie? 
17 A: He said it was cocalna. 
18 Q; And what does that mean sir? 
19 A: It means cocaine. 
20 Q: Was there anything else In the car? 
21 A: There were beer botdes found In the car. 
22 Q: Anything else sir? 
23 A: To my knowledge, no. 
24 Q: No further questions at this time. 
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1 Judge: Cross examination. 
2 CROSS EXAMINATION 
3 Dellapiana: Just briefly, Officer Findlay, you just responded as backup to the other officers on this 
4 case? 
5 A: I observed them on that side of the street, so I went over to see if I could assist diem in any way. 
6 Q: You didn't respond according to a call, you just saw them? 
7 A: No I wasn't dispatched. 
8 Q: At the time you saw the defendant, he was, at the dme that he, you asked him mis question 
9 about what was in the baggie. At that dme, he was on his, on his face toward the pavement? 
10 A: Yes sir. 
11 Q: He was handcuffed? 
12 A: Yes he was. 
13 Q: You mentioned that, one of the officers had said something about a gun being found? 
14 A: Yes sir. 
15 Q: In mat situation, normal protocol is the officers take out their own weapons in a safety 
16 precaution? 
17 A: No, we didn't draw our weapons, both die occupants of the vehicle were in plain sight of the 
18 officers, we had diem out of the car. They were out of the car when I arrived and standing near the 
19 rear of the pickup truck. Rather than pull weapons, we immediately put handcuffs on them and 
20 restrained die two occupants to our safety. 
21 Q: Is is your testimony then that you did not draw your weapon? 
22 A: I did not draw my firearm, no. 
23 Q: That's all I have for this witness. 
24 RE-DIRECT 
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1 Updegrove: Why were the defendant and passenger placed In handcuffs? 
2 A: Because Officer Farris who was searching the car, called out that he'd found a gun, so for our 
3 i safety we wanted to restrain the occupants, restrain em. 
4 Q: Thank you very much. 
5 Judge: Any re-cross? 
6 Dellapiana: Nothing further. 
7 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
8 Updegrove: Would you state your name and spell your last name please? 
9 A: Joel Schow, S-C-H-0-W. 
10 Q: You're from die Salt Lake City Police Officer, how long have you been with the police? 
11 A: About 4 years. 
12 Q: On the early morning hours of the 19th of May of this year, did you happen to be in the vicinity 
13 of 1525 South State Street In Salt Lake County? 
14 A: Yes I did. 
15 Q: And who were you with at the time? 
16 A: Officer Farris. 
17 Q: And what were you doing? 
18 A: I was In my police car, marked police car. 
19 Q: Who was driving? 
20 A: I was driving. 
21 Q: Did you see anything that caught your attention? 
22 A: Yes I did, we saw a truck driving Northbound, we were as well. 
23 Q: What brought your attendon about this truck driving Northbound? 
24 A: it was In the ah, outside lane, next to the curb, when It pulled off closer to the curbway than 
10 
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1 normal. Driving quite slow maybe 10 miles an h.. S mile an hour zone, it was... 
2 Q: I'm sorry, did you see anything else that was t , en to draw your attention? 
3 A: There were a couple of ladies walking along t:•-. side of the road, the same direction on the 
4 sidewalk, actually not on the side road, but they were on the sidewalk there, and Officer Farris, he's 
5 worked that area for quite awhile, seemed to be familiar with these ladies, and mentioned mat he... 
6 Dellapiana: Objection, hearsay. 
7 Updegrove: Your honor again this is an officer talking to another officer, and that is certainly, for 
8 purposes of this hearing reliable (inaudible) between concerning what's going to happen next. 
9 Dellapiana: Well, they can say what happened next, but I don't think it's necessary to elicit a 
10 particular response that I expect to hear from this officer, even though I'm not sure because I don't 
11 have a report. 
12 Judge: It would seem to me that the comment of the officer that he recognized these two ladies, 
13 would not be, would be reliable hearsay, and permissible at preliminary hearing, I'll overrule the 
14 objection. 
15 A: Okay, he mentioned that he was familiar with these ladies as being prostitutes in the area. 
16 Q: What did you do then? 
17 Deli: I'm gonna object to the foundation here, prostitutes, I mean, do we have some certified 
18 convictions, something, otherwise, I move to strike reference to prostitutes. I don't have any 
19 objection I guess, say that he recognized them. 
20 Judge: Did you want to respond counsel? 
21 Updegrove: Your honor, I don't have Officer Farris here, he's at scout camp in Wyoming, with a 
22 scout group. I believe though with the reliability issue of one officer telling his partner, he's had 
23 previous contact with them as prostitutes is reliable. 
24 Judge: Counsel, I'm not even sure that It's hearsay. I'm not sure that It's being offered for the truth 
11 
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1 of the matter asserted. In fact it's not relevant at all at this hearing, whether or not they really were 
2 in fact prostitutes. 
3 Dellapiana: (agree. 
4 Judge; The truth is, it's Just explanatory as to what may have happened next, so 111 find that it's not 
5 hearsay, and again overrule the objection. 
6 Updegrove: Then what happened sir? 
7 A: Urn, I pulled in behind them and activated my overhead lights. 
8 Q: Did they stop then? 
9 A: Not immediately, they drove for I mean, as much as a block or so. 
10 Q: How many people did you see in the vehicle? 
11 A: 2. 
12 , Q: Could you see any (Inaudible)? 
13 A: I could, back on the truck, I could see 2. 
14 Q: Did you see anybody else while they were In the process of stopping? 
15 A: Yea, well after I turned on my lights and kept going for what I considered an unusually long 
16 amount of time, they seemed to be shuffling around a lot and, my first thought is they're hiding 
17 something, okay, so. 
18 Q: When you say they were shuffling around, would you please a little more specific? 
19 A: They were both moving around, seemed to be bending down, kind of frantically, as if they were 
2 0 hiding something under the seats or... 
21 Q: Did they ultimately stop? 
22 A: They did. 
23 Q: Then what happened? 
24 A: I approached the drivers side of the car, and Officer Farrls got out He went up the side of, he 
12 
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1 went up behind a tree, almost equal toward the, the truck was stopped, here's our car and here's the 
2 truck and he went up behind a tree here and watched them, and I went up to the driver here, and 
7 as I approached, the driver stepped out, opened the door and stepped out of the car. 
4 Q: Your honor, for the purposes of the record, would indicate that Officer Schow was approached 
5 on the driver's side and Officer Farris, came around on the passenger side, when (inaudible) slightly 
6 in front of the passenger doors, is that correct? 
7 A: A possibly or fairly equal to the passenger door. 
8 Q: And as die driver stepped out, is he present in court today? 
9 A: He is. 
10 Q: Please point him out and describe what he is wearing? 
11 A: He's wearing a white shirt with die word IOWA in yellow. 
12 Q: Your honor may the record reflect that the witness has Identified the defendant? 
13 Judge: It will. 
14 Q: Now did you look in the truck? 
15 A: I did. 
16 Q: Did you see anything? 
17 A: First thing that I did notice on the, sort of the center of the floor board area, was an open bottle 
18 of budweiser, a 12 oz. bottle. 
19 Q: Then what happened? 
20 A: I got him, brought him to the back of the truck. 
21 Q: When you say htm, who do you mean? 
22 A: The defendant, the driver, to the back of the truck. Officer Farris, by that time had moved up 
23 right up next to the passenger side of the truck, and he looked In, and I later found out that he had 
24 looked in and he had seen a open bottle... 
13 
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1 Deilapiana: Objection. 
2 Judge: That'd be hearsay, sustained. 
3 A: Okay, Officer Fanis approached the other side of the truck, while I dealt with the driver, the 
4 defendant towards the back of the truck and I believe he had the passenger step out and brought him 
5 back as well. 
6 Q: After you had both the individuals, the defendant and his passenger brought back to the back of 
7 the truck, what happened then? 
8 A: Officer Farris had started to look inside the truck and then he moved around to the driver's side 
9 of the truck. I was to the back of the truck with the both men. 
10 Q: Did you hear Officer Farris say..? 
11 A: Yea he said one word and he said gun, and that's common when we find a gun during a search, 
12 we'll say gun, to let the other officer's know. 
13 Q: Then what happened? 
14 A: I'm trying to remember when Officer Findley arrived. Officer Findley had arrived by this point, 
15 and I believe he dealt with die passenger, and Officer Farris came back and ordered the driver, he 
16 gave die driver some kind of command, put your hands up or something like mat. 
17 Q: When you're referring to die driver, you're referring to die defendant? 
18 A: To the defendant 
19 Q: Did the defendant put his hands up in the air? 
20 A: He didn't put his hands up, and Officer Farris took him to the ground on the roadway and 
21 handcuffed him. 
22 Q: Was the passenger handcuffed? 
23 A: Yes, by officer Findiey. 
24 Q: Then what happened? 
14 
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1 A: Officer Farris got the gun out of the truck and he brought it back. 
2 Q: And did you see die gun? 
3 A: (did. 
4 Q: What kind of gun was it? 
5 A: It was a revolver. 
6 Q: Did you see where it came from? 
7 A: Yea, it was hist in, if I'm sitting in die side of the passenger, the driver seat of the truck, it 
8 would've been just about where my left hand would be, kind of in mat area. 
9 Q: (inaudible) the drivers? 
10 A: Yea. 
1 i Q: What kind of a gun was it? 
12 A: It was a revolver, it was a .357 mag revolver, and as he brought it out, brought it back, he 
13 opened the cylinder on it and dumped 6 cartridges out of it loaded. 
14 Q: Then what happened? 
15 A: Officer Findley somewhere around this point, was dealing with die passenger, and he informed 
16 me that he had found a bag of what he diought was cocaine. 
17 Dellapiana: Objection to the reference as to the kind of die substance and what the other officer 
18 thought it might be. Again hearsay. 
19 Updegrove: This is die passenger we're talking about. 
20 A: That's correct yes, it was die driver he was talking about 
21 Judge: Okay, so it is, it is (inaudible), and your objection's based on hearsay? 
22 Dellapiana: Weil and yes, It's something the officer said, It's something the other officer diought, 
23 there's no foundation where his conclusion as to what the nature of die white powder might be. 
24 judge: I'm going to sustain ft counsel, I mink it's certainty hearsay, and it may be reliable, but the 
15 
O O O O C i 1 
1 problem is the officer that made the statement, we don't have any foundation as to whether that 
2 officer's had training in identifying controlled substances, nothing of that sort, so it would be Just a 
3 raw opinion at this point, and I'll sustain the objection. 
4 Q: Did you see the baggie taken from the defendant's pocket? 
5 A: I can't remember that I did see it coming out of his pocket or not, I saw Officer Findley with it 
6 though. 
7 Q: Did you see die baggie after it was in Officer Findiey's possession? 
8 A: I did. 
9 Q: What did you see in the baggie? 
10 A: White powder. 
11 Q: What training have you had in the Identification and interdiction of narcotics? 
1 2 . A: I was trained at Utah (inaudible) Peace Officer Standards and Training, many hours of training 
13 in our in-house academy, I've worked on the streets for 3 1/2 years, primarily in high drug areas, 
14 I've made many many drug arrests. I worked in narcotics for about 3 months as well, in Salt Lake 
15 City Narcotics. 
16 Q: How closely did you observe the baggie? 
17 A: Oh within, just a very short distance, within a couple feet. 
18 Q: Based on your training and experience....? 
19 Dellaplana: There's no way, I object, may I speak now... 
20 Judge: Your objecting, go ahead, state die basis, is the basis fust foundation? 
21 Dellaplana: The basis is definitely foundation Judge, all he knows is white powder, anybody that's 
22 trained, icnows that there needs to be some tests. White powder by itself, I can't see how it could 
23 possibly be anything other than, possibly a controlled substance. I object on foundation. 
24 Judge: Counsel? 
16 
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1 Updegrove: Your honor, I'm fust asking based on his training and experience, what it might be here, 
2 could possibly be. I'm not asking him to state categorically what it is. 
3 Judge: I think counsel, you've asked him how it compares with substances he's seen and knows it's 
4 cocaine, but I'll sustain the objection to the question as it was phrased. 
5 Q: How did it compare with the substances you've seen as cocaine? 
6 A: It was consistent with what I've seen as cocaine, many many times. 
7 Q: Did you hear Officer Findley ask the defendant what it was? 
8 A: I did. 
9 Q: And did you hear the defendant's response? 
10 A: He said cocaine. 
11 Deiiapiana: Ah yea, your honor, 1 guess If we could, I think we made this record already. 
12 Judge: You did counsel, unless you have a different objection? 
13 Deiiapiana: No, same objection Judge. 
14 Judge: And 1 would overrule the objection. The answer can stand. 
1 5 ' Q: Did, who took the loaded revolver and the baggie of white substance and placed in evidence? 
16 A: Officer Farris did I believe. 
17 Q: Was he with you for the rest of the (inaudible)? 
18 A: Yes, yea we went to jail and then we went to the police station. 
19 Q: Did Officer Farris keep it with him at all times? 
20 A: He left the gun In the car when we went into fall. We can't take guns into fall. 
21 Q: Did he take the substance with him? 
22 A: I can't say for sure. 
23 Q: Thank you very much dr. 
24 Judge: Cross examination. 
17 
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1 CROSS EXAMINATION 
2 Dellapiana: Okay Officer Schow, when you observed the baggie of white powder, was it your 
3 testimony, wait, is it your testimony that Officer Fanis had possession of it? 
4 A: When I first observed it? No Officer Findiey did. 
5 Q: Oh, Officer Findiey, I'm sorry, and then what did Officer Findiey do with it, if you have personal 
6 knowledge? Did he give it to, I guess let me be more specific I'm sorry. Did at any time, you have 
7 possession of it? 
8 A: I can't say for sure. 
9 Q: in your experience as a narcotics squad, is it safe to say that on other occasions, when you 
10 observed white powder, it's turned out not to be a controlled substance? 
11 A: There have been times. 
12 Q: White powder has sometimes been, sugar? 
13 A: The best I can say, probably almost every time, it's turned out to be baking soda. 
14 Q: Baking soda. In your training as a, on the narcotics squad, you trained in the use, I think a term 
15 is, field test, a chemical field test. 
16 A: (inaudible). 
17 Q: What's the purpose of those tests? 
18 A: To test for drugs. 
19 Q: Okay so why do you test the substances to see if they're drugs? 
20 A: To confirm to see if they're drugs. 
21 Q: That didn't happen as far as you're aware of in this case was it? 
22 A: I don't believe so, those are very scarce. It's real hard to get our hands on those to tell you the 
23 truth. 
24 Q: You've previously done such tests? 
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1 A: Oh yea, yes sir. 
2 Q: And when you get your hands on a kit, you prefer it? 
3 A: Yes. 
4 Q: The gun, you said it was a, how do you describe it, a revolver? 
5 A: A revolver. 
6 Q: You didn't mention this on your direct testimony but, can you tell me whether the safety on the 
7 gun was on or off? 
8 A: I've never seen revolver's with a safety before. 
9 Q: You haven't? 
10 A: And I don't think there was a safety on it 
11 Q: it's not evidence, (inaudible) but anyway, so you're saying that you don't recall seeing a safety 
12 on this gun? 
13 A: I'm aimost positive there's no safety on the gun. 
14 Q: But not quite? 
15 A: A manual catch safety you don't, there's very very rarely, and I'm almost sure that there was not 
16 one on the gun. 
17 Q: But you're not sure? 
18 A: 90%. 
19 Q: Urn, you said when you stopped the, when you stopped the truck, by the way, you saw the truck 
20 the occupants appeared to be nervous, shuffling around Is that right? 
2\ A: That's correct. 
22 Q: Have you ever noticed before that when you turn on your overheads, you come up behind 
23 somebody, often times, they appear to be nervous? 
24 A: Well nervous or shuffling around, hiding things. I think mere's a difference there. 
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1 Q: Your impression was that they were hiding something? 
2 A: It was. 
3 Q: (inaudible) 
4 A: That's correct. 
5 Q: Um, now where did you find this bottle of beer, when you opened the car door? 
6 A: The one that I could see was on the floor board, more towards the center of the truck. 
7 Q: In plain view? 
8 A: Yes. 
9 Q: Not hidden? 
10 A: (Inaudible). 
11 Q: Um, now, when you say that mere were two women on the sidewalk. The truck is going 
12 Northbound, is that correct? 
13 A: That's correct. 
14 Q: The women were coming Southbound? 
15 A: I believe the women were walking Northbound as well on the sidewalk. 
16 Q: Oh, are you sure? 
17 A: I think so, if I said Southbound earlier, I didn't mean to. The best that I can remember, they 
18 were walking Northbound as well. 
19 Q: They were walking Northbound? 
20 A: Yea that's right on the East sidewalk of State Street 
21 Q: Um, you said the truck was, b it fair to say, are you familiar with the faa that the average foot 
22 speed is about 3 miles an hour? 
23 A: Correct 
24 Q: So the truck was going about 10 miles an hour? 
20 
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1 A: Well yea, a very rough estimate. 
2 Q: So the truck was passing the people on the sidewalk? 
3 A: It would've been. 
4 Q: And the people on the sidewalk were on die side of the truck where the passenger was, is that 
5 correct? 
6 A: Correct. 
7 Q: Now Officer, there's no minimum speed limit posted on State Street is there? 
8 A: No. 
9 Q: Okay, but anyway, that's where you hit the overhead lights to pull the truck over, was almost 
10 immediately, were you the driver? 
11 A: Yes I was. 
12 Q: Okay and so did you turn on the overhead lights? 
13 A: Yes. 
14 Q: And who was It that called out that there was a gun? 
15 A: Officer Farris. 
16 Q: Okay, and at mat time, did you and Officer Farris draw your weapons? 
17 A: I don't believe so. 
18 Q: At any time did you draw your weapons? 
19 A: I don't believe so. 
20 Q: At the time, now who was it that asked the defendant what was in his pocket? 
21 A: I believe Officer Findiey did. 
22 Q: At that time, as far as you know, was Mr. Rodriguez the person who was there on the ground, 
23 was he given his miranda warnings? 
24 A: Not that I know of. 
21 
C C 0 ' • f: -
1 Q: The officer just asked him what was in the bag? 
2 A: As far as I know. 
3 Q: Nothing further for this witness. 
4 Judge: Any re-dlrect? 
5 Updegrove: Very briefly your honor. 
6 RE-DIRECT 
7 Updegrove: What did you see Officer Farris do with the baggie of white substance? 
8 A: Ultimately, as in booking it into evidence? 
9 Q: Yes, what did you see him do? 
10 A: We booked it into evidence. 
11 Q: And where was that? 
12 A: We always do it on the 2nd floor of the police station, (inaudible) that's where they always do 
13 it. 
14 Q: Are you familiar with an individual by die name of Neeves? 
15 A: Yea, Bill Neves. 
16 Q: What does he do? 
17 A: Mr. Neves, he's a retired officer, he comes in takes evidence out of the evidence room and takes 
18 it out to die crime lab to be tested at the State Crime Lab. 
19 Q: May I approach the witness your honor? 
20 Judge: Yes. 
21 Q: I hand you what's been marked as State's exhibit number 1, do you recognize what that Is sir? 
22 A: Yea this is a return from the State Crime Lab. 
23 Q: And ah, does It have a name on it? 
24 A: It's got a few names on ft, I'm not sure which one. 
22 
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1 Dellapiana: I would object, tills is hearsay. 
2 Updegrove: Your honor, the report speaks for itself, and it's reliable hearsay, and we're, I'm asking 
3 what the names are on it. 
4 Judge: )ust to repeat all of the names he reads on the report? 
5 Updegrove: No, is there an individual defendant on i t 
6 Dellapiana: Well my objection still stands. 
7 Judge: Okay, 111 overrule the objection, however, it would seem to me reliable hearsay, does the 
8 defendant's name appear on that report? 
9 A: Yes sir it does. 
10 Q: And does Mr. Neeves name ippear on that report? 
11 A: Yes sir. 
12 Q: And what is it your Mr. Neeves did? 
13 A: Deliver. 
14 Q: Deliver it where? 
15 A: To the State Crime Lab. 
16 Q: Your honor at this time the State would move to admit State's exhibit number 1 ? 
17 Dellapiana: Urn, the whole of the exhibit, I'd still object. I don't mink the state's has met the 
18 foundational of, met the foundational objection. I know the court has overruled my hearsay 
19 confrontation, cross examination objection's, but I don't think they've met the foundation fully, the 
20 actual test result in this case. 
21 Updegrove: May I respond your honor? 
22 judge: Yes. 
23 Updegrove: Now, the foundation has been bid. Officer Findley testified they took the white 
24 powder. Officer Schow was with Officer Farris that night, observed it to go into the crime lab. Mr. 
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1 Neves works at the crime lab. Mr. Neves delivered substance taken from Nelson Rodriguez, Nelson 
2 Rodriguez-Lopez. I believe the state has shown the foundation of getting it to the lab and the report 
3 Itself is reliable hearsay. 
4 Judge: Go ahead counsel. 
5 RE-CROSS 
6 Dellapiana: Now Officer Schow, you said that you took this and made an evidence report? 
7 A: That I made an evidence, I don't remember saying that. 
8 Q: You didn't make an evidence report did you? 
9 A: No I don't think I did. 
10 Q: When you put something in evidence, you make an evidence report don't you? 
11 A: Yes. 
12 Q: Did you make any reports, and different reports on this case? 
13 A: I made the report with Officer Farris in the Jail, mat die main report that you have. 
14 Q: Probable cause, (inaudible) cause statement? 
15 A: Yes, and in this case, that's considered our report as well. 
16 Q: Okay, Judge first off, I don't think that they made, he's admitted he didn't, If he's the one who 
17 put on the evidence that he would've (inaudible) reports, he admitted he didn't do that, and even 
18 if there was a chain established up to getdng it to die State Crime Lab, there still isn't any foundations 
19 as to what happened after it got there. So the results of the test, even if there were a chain of 
20 custody, the results of this test still doesn't have any foundation. 
21 Updegrove: And I call that reliable hearsay. 
22 judge; Counsel It's correct that we don't know whether the substance or how it was analyzed, what 
23 procedures were used and you're prohibited from cross examining, I appreciate that, but it still seems 
24 to me that the constitution was amended to permit this kind of evidence at preliminary hearing at 
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1 least, and ah, based on the change in the constitution, I'll overrule your objection and because of the 
2 fact that this officer at least assisted in placing this item into evidence, that's sufficient to satisfy me 
3 and I will overrule the objection. Plaintiff's exhibit number 1 will be received. 
4 RE-DIRECT 
5 Updegrove: And what does die test reveal? 
6 A: It state's cocaine was identified in the plastic bag, and the total grams were 4.1 grams. 
7 Q: Thank you very much sir. 
8 Judge: Re-cross examination? 
9 Dellapiana: No your honor. 
10 Judge: Alright you can sit down officer. Any other witnesses for the state? 
11 Updegrove: No sir the state rests. 
12 Judge: Counsel for the defense, any good evidence to be offered on behalf of the defendant? 
13 Dellapiana: Your honor no, urn, Mr. Rodriguez is going to exercise his right not to testify at this 
14 hearing. 
15 Judge: Okay, anything further from the state in support of its case in chief? 
16 Updegrove: Nothing sir. 
17 Judge: Anything from the defense? 
18 Dellapiana: No your honor. 
19 Judge: Mr. Lopi then, based on the evidence I've heard today. The evidence that you were arrested 
20 and seen within a shirt pocket was a baggie containing a white powdery substance that visually at least 
21 compared favorably with cocaine, that one of the officer's had seen on many occasions. Based on 
22 the testimony that you said that it was cocaine, and apparently that substance has been analyzed by 
23 the state crime laboratory, and found it contained cocaine. It would be the judgment of this court, 
24 that the state has sustained Its burden, with respea to count i and also with respea to count's II and 
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1 III. I'll enter your not guilty pleas for now and set the next hearing in die DIstria Court. 
2 Clerk: July 12th, at 9:00 a.m. before Judge Frederick. 
3 Judge: I'll order you to appear Mr. Lopf, in Judge Frederick's court on July the 12th at 9:00. On 
4 my own modon, Til return to the state the custody of exhibit 1. 
5 
6 
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ADDENDUM B 
RALPH DELLAPIANA, #6861 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER /~SOC. 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, VT 84111 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF WTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
DUE TO LACK OF REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO STOP 
CASE NO. 961901205 FS 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
The Defendant NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI, by and through his 
attorney RALPH DELLAPIANA, r. ves this Court to suppress all 
evidence obtained as a result, of the illegal seizure of Mr. 
Rodriguez-Lopi. The seizure violated the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to 
believe Mr. Rodriguez-Lopi had committed or was in the act of 
committing a public offense. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648 (1979), State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Carpena. 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of July, 1996, 
Counsel for Defendant 
i' C t, i " !* 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the DIstria Attorney, 231 East 
400 South, Salt Uke Qty, Utah 84111, this 0?~ day of Ju[y, 1996. 
c r . r . 0 7 ^ 
RALPH DELLAPIANA (6861) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE DF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI 
Defendant. 
I MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER 
I Case No. 961901205 FS 
i JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
The Defendant NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI, by and through his 
attorney RALPH DELLAPIANA, moves this Court to quash the 
magistrate's bindover of the above case on the grounds that there 
was insufficient competent evidence to prove that Mr. Rodriguez-
Lopi possessed a controlled substance. Specifically, the 
toxicology report purportedly proving that the substance 
allegedly possessed by Mr. Rodriguez-Lopi was a controlled 
substance was inadmissible hearsay. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
(permitting only reliable hearsay as defined by statute or rule); 
Utah R. Evid. 803(8)(B). Moreover, no foundation was provided as 
to the nature or reliability of the actual test or its result. 
£££ State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 (Utah 1989). 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1 
RALPH DELLAPIANA 
G u U f; - i 
• I - ^ 
M. t *» ^ r . . ^ _ j 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
DELIVERED/MAILED a true and correct copy of the foregoing to 
the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this day of July, 
1996. 
DELIVERED BY 
JUL 2 2 m 
/i r 0 r, fi r 2 
RALPH DELLAPIANA (6861) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 532-5444 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER 
Case No. 961901205 FS 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI, through his attorney RALPH 
DELLAPIANA, submits this memorandum in support of his motion to 
quash the bindover in the above-entitled matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On May 19, 1996, in the early morning hours, Officer 
Joel Schow of the Salt Lake City Police Department observed a 
truck driving northbound at about 1525 South State Street. Tr. 
10. Officer Schow stopped the vehicle. Tr. 12. Officer Richard 
Findlay, who was driving another police vehicle, saw that Officer 
Schow had initiated e stop and stopped to assist. Tr. 1. 
2. As the defendant was laying face down on the ground, 
Officer Findlay testified that he removed a plastic baggy from 
*• i? 
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the defendant's shirt pocket. Tr. 2. The officer stated that 
there was f,a white powdery like substance in the bag.M Tr. 2. 
Officer Findlay did not testify as to whether or not he had any 
training or experience in identifying controlled substances, see 
Tr. 16, nor did Officer Findlay give any opinion during his 
testimony as to what he thought the powdery substance might be. 
3. Officer Findlay stated that when he asked Mr. 
Rodriguez-Lopi what was in the bag, Mr. Rodriguez-Lopi said that 
it was cocaine. Tr. 2, 8. Counsel for the defendant objected to 
the admission of the statement on the grounds that the state had 
not provided sufficient admissible evidence to prove the corpus 
delicti of the crime by clear and convincing evidence. Tr. 2-3, 
8. The judge ruled that the officer's mere observation of the 
baggy with a white powdery substance was sufficient to prove the 
corpus, and admitted defendant's statement. Tr. 8. 
4. Officer Schow testified that he also observed a baggie 
containing white powder in the possession of Officer Findlay. 
Tr. 16. Officer Schow testified that he received POST training, 
many hours of training in-house, that he had worked on the 
streets for 3 1/2 years, primarily in high drug areas, including 
about 3 months in narcotics, and had made many drug arrests. 
Defendant objected on foundation grounds to the admission of any 
opinion by Officer Schow as to the character of the white powder. 
Tr. 16. Counsel for the State clarified the limited scope of the 
testimony sought from Officer Schow indicating that he was not 
asking the officer to "state categorically what it is,ff rather, 
4 
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just "what it might be here, could possibly be.M Tr. 17. 
Officer Schow was permitted to testify that he saw the 
baggie from "within a couple of feet," and that it was 
"consistent with" what he had previously seen as cocaine. Tr. 
16-17. Officer Schow admitted that there had been times in his 
experience when he had observed white powder that turned out to 
be baking soda instead of cocaine. Tr. 18. Officer Schow 
testified that his training included the performance of chemical 
field tests "to test for drugs," and agreed that he preferred to 
use such tests when he could; but, he admitted that he did not 
perform any such test in this case. Tr. 18-19. 
5. The State proffered as evidence of the nature of the 
substance allegedly possessed by Mr. Rodriguez-Lopi, State's 
exhibit number 1, a toxicology report from the state crime lab. 
Tr. 4, 22. Counsel for defendant objected on two principal 
grounds: first, that the document was inadmissible hearsay under 
the State Constitution and Rule 803(8)(B) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence; second, that no foundation was offered regarding the 
nature or reliability of the test purportedly conducted on the 
substance, nor was there adequate foundation as to the chain of 
custody. Tr. 4-6, 22-24. 
In regards to the hearsay objection, the judge found that 
the toxicology report was "reliable hearsay" and thus admissible 
in preliminary hearing. Tr. 6. 
In regards to the foundational objections, the judge allowed 
the officer to read (over defendant's hearsay objection) a cover 
5 
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page attached to the toxicology report purporting to establish a 
chain of custody. Tr. 23. In addition, although the judge found 
that "it's correct that we don't know whether the substance or 
how it was analyzed, what procedures were used..." he decided 
that the evidence was nevertheless admissible at preliminary 
hearing based on the change in the constitution. Tr. 24-25. The 
judge then bound over Mr. Rodriguez-Lopi on all counts. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In order to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the 
prosecution must present sufficient competent evidence to 
establish that the crime charged has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2). The 
prosecution is not required to introduce enough evidence to 
establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
must present a quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant 
submission of the case to the trier of fact. State v. Pledger, 
896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995), citing State v. Anderson, 612 
P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980). 
I. The Admissible Evidence Presented at the Preliminary 
Hearing Was Insufficient to Establish that Mr. 
Rodricruez-Lopi Possessed a Controlled Substance. 
The bindover of this case should be quashed because there 
was insufficient competent evidence to show that Mr. Rodriguez-
Lopi knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled 
substance. As explained below, the document admitted as evidence 
6 
that the substance allegedly possessed by Mr. Rodriguez-Lopi was 
purportedly a controlled substance was inadmissible hearsay. In 
addition, no foundation was established for the reliability of 
the chemical test purportedly proving that the substance tested 
was methamphetamine. 
A. The State Crime Laboratory Report Should Have Been 
Excluded As Unreliable Hearsay. 
1- The State Crime Laboratory Report Is 
"Unreliable*1 Under Rule 803(8) (B). 
The magistrate erred in admitting as evidence the document 
entitled ffState of Utah Crime Laboratory Report11 (State Crime 
Laboratory Report) because that document was inadmissible 
hearsay. The Utah Constitution requires that any hearsay 
evidence proffered in a preliminary hearing be limited to 
"reliable hearsay" "as defined by statute or rule." UTAH CONST. 
art. I § 12 (1994 amendment). 
The Utah Rules of Evidence help define "reliable hearsay." 
Specifically, the exceptions to the hearsay rule provide guidance 
as to the types of hearsay that may be deemed "reliable." The 
Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he exceptions to the 
rule have evolved to permit the admission of evidence that is 
deemed reliable notwithstanding its failure to satisfy the 
hearsay rule." State v. Lone. 721 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1986) 
(emphasis added), citing Wigmore, EVIDENCE, § 1420. Thus, 
evidence that fits within a recognized hearsay exception could be 
deemed "reliable" hearsay. 
Similarly, evidence that is specifically excluded by the 
7 
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rules of evidence should be deemed as having been determined to 
be insufficiently reliable to be made an exception to the hearsay 
rule. For example, Rule 803(8)(B) specifically excludes 
documents from law enforcement sources. Statefs Exhibit #1, 
entitled "State of Utah Crime Laboratory Report/1 as further 
explained below, is a record from a law enforcement source. 
Accordingly, the report is specifically inadmissible under Rule 
803(8)(B), and should not have been admitted into evidence at the 
preliminary hearing. 
A federal court of appeals case involving the application of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) to chemical analysis of suspected 
controlled substances by chemists employed by the U.S. Customs 
Service is instructive. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 
(2d Cir. 1977). In Oates, the court of appeals held that the 
report of the custom's chemist was inadmissible hearsay under 
each of two provisions of Rule 803(8). First, the court 
lfconclud[ed] without hesitation11 that the chemist's report 
contained "factual findings result from an investigation made 
pursuant to authority granted by law" and thus was inadmissible 
under Rule 803(8)(C). Id. at 67-68 (citing Advisory Committee on 
the Rules of Evidence, Notes of the Advisory Committee on 
Proposed Rules, Introductory Note to Article VIII, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
292 (1972)). The court also held that the chemist's report was 
inadmissible under Rule 803(8)(B) because the chemist was an 
employee of a governmental agency which has law enforcement 
responsibilities and thus qualified as "other law enforcement 
8 
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personnel" under the rule. Id. 
The holding of the Oates case is applicable to the case at 
bar by analogy in that the report admitted as State's Exhibit #1 
was purported prepared by a chemist employed by the Utah State 
Crime Laboratory. The state crime laboratory has law enforcement 
responsibilities. The state crime laboratory is part of an 
entity named the MLaw Enforcement and Technical Services Division 
Administration.ff See Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-101 to -104 (1995) 
(emphasis added). One of the division's duties is to "analyze 
evidence from crime scenes and crime-related incidents for 
criminal prosecution." Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-104(5) (emphasis 
added). It is also notable that the chemist refers to himself 
not as a chemist but as a "Criminalist." State's Exhibit #1. 
This is consistent with the State Crime Laboratory's perception 
of its role as part of a law enforcement agency. Defendant 
therefore urges this court to follow the Oates court's carefully 
considered opinion and hold that State's Exhibit #1 should have 
been excluded as unreliable hearsay from a law enforcement source 
in accordance with the provisions of Utah Rule of Evidence 
803(8)(B) and article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
Analogous Utah case law, albeit dictum, also supports 
exclusion of State's Exhibit #1 as unreliable hearsay under rule 
803(8)(B). In Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah App. 
1987), the Utah Court of Appeals considered the admissibility of 
chemical evidence, (the breathalyzer), in an administrative 
license suspension hearing. The court of appeals affirmed the 
9 
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district court's reversal of the license suspension on the ground 
that the breathalyzer result was improperly admitted into 
evidence. Id. at 416-17. The court held that although the 
breathalyzer evidence was potentially admissible as a public 
record under Rule 803(6) and Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3, that no 
foundation was established as to the proper maintenance of the 
breathalyzer machine, nor to whether the test was administered by 
a qualified operator. Id. at 416. In addition, the court 
determined that although administrative agencies may generally 
rely on hearsay evidence, id. at 415, the breathalyzer test did 
not qualify for admission under Rule 803(8)(B) in that case due 
to unreliability or "lack of trustworthiness." Id. at 417. 
Regarding the admissibility of chemical tests in criminal 
prosecutions, the Kehl court stated in dictum that fl[i]f the 
[DUI] report were proffered by the State in a criminal 
prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, even with 
the proper 'reliability1 affidavits, it would clearly be 
inadmissible under the public records exception.ff Id. at 417 n.7 
(citing Utah R. Evid. 803(8)(B)). 
Similarly, in the case at bar, the admission of the 
criminalist's test result as State's Exhibit #1 was error. The 
judge correctly found that the State made USL showing as to 
whether or how the substance was analyzed nor as to what 
procedures were used in testing, Tr. 24-25. Accordingly, the 
test result should have been excluded as not having been shown to 
be "reliable.11 
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The 1994 Amendment to Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution also refers us to "statutes'1 to determine what 
"reliable hearsay" means. There is not yet any statute 
comparable to section 41-6-44.3 (establishing the admissibility 
of chemical breath tests) that mandates the admissibility of 
chemical substance tests such as the one at issue in this case. 
However, the Utah State Legislature has given the Department of 
Public Safety a mandate to establish standards for the 
administration and analysis of chemical tests. Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-21 (1995). These standards would then presumably provide 
the prerequisite foundational requirement for the admissibility 
of chemical tests in the same way that chemical breath tests are 
used in DUI prosecutions. See Kehl, supra. The fact that the 
Viah State Legislature has ordered the development of testing 
standards implies an intention to exclude test results that are 
proffered without a snowing that reliable testing procedures were 
followed. 
In the instant case, as previously noted, at the preliminary 
hearing the State made ii£ showing as to whether or how the 
substance was analyzed nor as to what procedures were used in 
testing. Tr. 24-25. Accordingly, the test result should have 
been excluded under rules of evidence that indicate that such 
evidence is not deemed "reliable." 
2. The State Crime Laboratory Report Is Also 
Inadmissible Under Rule 803(6). 
The State Crime Laboratory Report does not qualify under 
11 
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Rule 803(6), Records of regularly conducted activity. First, 
federal courts have held that the business records exception 
cannot be used as a "back door" to introduce evidence that would 
not be admissible under Rule 803(8)(B). United States v. Cain. 
615 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Oates, 560 
P.2d at 68). 
In addition, for evidence to be admissible as a business 
record, a proper foundation must be laid to establish the 
necessary indicia of reliability, including: 
(1) the record must be made in the regular course of 
the business or entity which keeps the records; (2) the 
record must have been made at the time of, or in close 
proximity to, the occurrence of the act, condition or 
event recorded; (3) the evidence must support a 
conclusion that after recordation the document was kept 
under circumstances that would preserve its integrity; 
and (4) the sources of the information from which the 
entry was made and the circumstances of the preparation 
of the document were such as to indicate its 
trustworthiness. Generally, the requisite foundation 
can be made by the custodian of the records. 
State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983). 
In Bertul, a case interpreting the admissibility of law 
enforcement records under the old business records rule 63(13), 
the Utah Supreme Court determined that "routine" matters "such as 
the day a crime was reported" are admissible as business records. 
Id. However, the court held that non-routine information such as 
witness statements and statements that may depend on the memory, 
perception, or motivation of the reporter, or that involve 
conclusions, are not admissible under the rule. Id. 
Furthermore, the court added that since police reports are 
generally made for the purpose of successfully prosecuting a 
12 
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crime, the reasons which might otherwise provide a basis to 
assume reliability of such reports as business records fto not 
exist where police reports are offered by the prosecution in a 
criminal proceedings. Id. 
In the case at bar, the State Crime Laboratory Report that 
provided the chemical analysis of the substance at issue in this 
case is non-routine and inadmissible because it depends on the 
perception of the reporter upon conducting a chemical test on the 
evidence. Moreover, the test result of the criminalist is a 
conclusion and is properly characterized as a witness statement, 
and thus is inadmissible under Bertul when offered by the 
prosecution in this criminal proceeding. 
In addition, in the case at bar, the prosecution proffered 
no evidence at all to establish gnv part of the fom-part 
foundation described by the Bertul court above. Thus, State's 
Exhibit #1 should have been excluded. See Kehl v. Schwendiman, 
735 P.2d at 417 (excluding breathalyzer test result under Rule 
803(6) due to lack of testimony by the custodian of the records 
as to the four foundational prerequisites for the admission of 
evidence as a business record). Therefore, for all the above 
reasons, the magistrate's admission of the State Crime Laboratory 
Report cannot be upheld under the business records exception. 
3. The Admission of the State Crime Laboratory 
Report Violated Defendant's Rights of 
Confrontation and Cross-Examination. 
Defendants in Utah have a right to cross-examine the 
witnesses against them at preliminary hearings. Utah R. Crim. P. 
13 
7(h)(1). The preliminary examination is not a one-sided 
determination of probable cause, but an adversary proceeding in 
which the evidence elicited by defense counsel on cross-
examination may lead the examining magistrate to discharge the 
defendant for lack of probable cause. State v. Anderson, 512 
P.2d 778, 783 & n.19 (Utah 1980). 
Defendants in Utah also have a constitutional right to 
confront the witnesses against them at a preliminary hearing. 
Id. at 786. The Utah Supreme Court declared: 
The protections afforded bv the right of confrontation 
at the preliminary examination are equally important 
and so inter-related to the right to effective counsel 
and the presentation of a defense that they must be 
guaranteed the accused at the preliminary hearing. 
Classically, the primary object of the 
constitutional right of confrontation is to prevent 
depositions and ex parte affidavits from being used 
against the accused at trial in lieu of a personal 
examination and cross-examination of the witness 
against him. When confrontation is available the 
accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the 
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, 
but of compelling him to stand face-to-face with the 
jury in order that they may look at him and judge by 
his demeanor and the manner in which he gives his 
testimony whether he is worthy of belief. Encompassed 
in this right of confrontation is the procedural right 
of cross-examination and the recognition of certain 
procedural rights regarding the exclusion of 
extrajudicial statements, similar to those found 
protected bv evidentiary rules excluding hearsay 
evidence. 
fnderson, 512 P.2d at 785 (emphasis added), citing Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 2003, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 
(1969); Mattox v. United States. 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 
L.Ed. 409 (1894). 
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial 
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court had erroneously permitted the admission of the sworn 
affidavit of a material witness at preliminary hearing. The 
court concluded that if the preliminary examination is to retain 
any meaningful significance in the criminal prosecution, the 
prosecution cannot be allowed to based its showing of probable 
cause on hearsay evidence such as the testimony of a material 
witness via an extra judicium affidavit. Id. at 786. 
In the case at bar, the conclusion of the criminalist that 
is alleged to have determined that the substance in question is 
methamphetamine is even less reliable than the hearsay testimony 
found to have been erroneously admitted in Anderson. In 
Anderson, the hearsay testimony of one of the witnesses was 
presented by way of a sworn affidavit. Id. at 782. In contrast, 
in the case at bar the statement is unsworn and is merely a two-
sentence conclusion without any context. Moreover, the 
criminalist's report has been shown above to be excluded by Rule 
803(8)(B) of the hearsay rules. See id. at 785 (noting that the 
hearsay rule exclusions are procedural protections encompassed by 
the confrontation clause). Thus, since the admission of a sworn 
affidavit was found to violate the defendant's rights to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses in Anderson. the criminalist's 
unsworn conclusion in this case should also be found to have been 
erroneously admitted as evidence. 
Similar values are expressed in United States v. Oates 
wherein the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the 
admission of chemist's written report (without the chemist's 
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presence) analyzing alleged controlled substances violated the 
defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses 
against him. Oates, 560 F.2d at 68-69 (citing the Advisory 
Committee's Notes and congressional legislative history). In 
sum, Defendant urges this court to recognize that the admission 
of State's Exhibit #1 violated his right to confront the 
witnesses against him and to quash the bindover in this case. 
B. No Foundation Was Provided For The Chemical 
Test Result Presented on the State Crime 
Laboratory Report. 
The preliminary hearing judge erred in admitting without 
foundation the criminalistic analysis purporting to prove that 
the substance at issue in this case was cocaine. At the 
preliminary hearing, counsel for Mr. Rodriguez-Lopi argued that 
the foundational prerequisite for the admission of the crime lab 
report must include: (1) a chain of custody, and (2) testimony 
regarding the reliability of the scientific test result. Tr. 4-
6, 22-24. 
To establish a chain of custody, the judge allowed the 
officer to read (over defendant's hearsay objection) a cover page 
attached to the toxicology report purporting to establish a chain 
of custody. The judge found that it was "reliable hearsay." Tr. 
4, 23. 
Defendant first argues that this cover page should be 
excluded as unreliable hearsay under Rule 803(8)(B) for the same 
reason the toxicology report itself is excluded by the rules. 
See Discussion in section I.A. supra. Consequently, the chain of 
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custody was not established by competent evidence. 
Second, and perhaps more important, is the lack of 
foundation for the test result contained in the State Crime 
Laboratory Report. A foundation as to the inherent reliability 
of a scientific test is a prerequisite to admissibility. Stfrte 
v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 403 (Utah 1989). The required 
foundation includes the qualifications of the tester, the 
reliability of the principles underlying the test, and testimony 
that the test was performed correctly, ^d. at 398 n.7. 
The criminalist's test result is clearly a scientific test. 
The Utah Code defines criminalistics as "the scientific 
discipline directed to the recognition, identification, 
individualization, and evaluation of physical evidence by 
application of the natural sciences in law-science matters. Utah 
Code Ann. § 53-5-102(1). At the preliminary hearing, defendant 
argued that without some foundation as to nature of the test 
performed by the person that did the test, there was no 
foundation for admitting the test result. Tr. 16. 
It must remain undisputed that no evidence whatsoever was 
offered as a foundation for the results of the State Crime 
Laboratory Report. There was no evidence of the qualifications 
of the tester. There was no evidence as to nature or reliability 
of the test used, nor that the test was performed correctly. The 
1
 Cf. State v. Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1984) (finding 
adequate chain of custody despite mailing of sample to central 
laboratory for testing where Mthe particular sample that was mailed 
here was also otherwise traceably transferred from party-to-party 
and identified."). 
17 
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judge correctly found that the state had not shown whether or how 
the substance was analyzed nor what procedures were used.1' Tr. 
24-25. Consequently, the admission of the document into evidence 
was error. Thus, excluding the erroneously admitted evidence, 
there was inadequate proof of the element of the charge that the 
substance in question was a controlled substance, and the 
bindover should be quashed. 
C. flr. Rpdriqvez-frppl,g ftptfment fcfcat the 
substance in Question was cocaine should be 
gxclyded fregaug? the gtafr? ffrij-gfl tP 
establish the corpus delicti. 
The State did not provide clear and convincing independent 
evidence of the crime of possession of a controlled substance. 
It is a well-established rule of evidence that "before a 
defendant's inculpatory statements can be introduced as evidence 
against defendant, the [prosecution] must prove the occurrence of 
a crime, i.e., a corpus delicti.M Provo Citv Corp. v. Spotts, 
861 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah App. 1993). To satisfy the rule, Mthe 
prosecution must show bv clear and convincing evidence that a 
wrong was done and (ii) such wrong was the result of criminal 
conduct." Id. (emphasis added). 
The case of Provo Citv v. Spotts is analogous to the case at 
bar. In Spotts, the State attempted to introduce the defendant's 
inculpatory statements regarding his use of marijuana. The 
following evidence was admitted to establish the corpus delicti: 
(1) the arresting officer observed the defendant smoke a small 
(one-half inch) rolled cigarette which the officer recognized as 
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a "joint11; (2) the cigarette disintegrated rapidly" as it burned, 
that the officer's training and experience indicated was typical 
of a marijuana cigarette; (3) the officer, in light of her 
training and experience, characterized defendant's method of 
inhalation as taking "hits" characterized by deep inhalation 
followed by long retention in the lungs; (4) these events took 
place in a vacant parking lot onto which the defendant had driven 
his vehicle from a public street; (5) the vehicles1 windows were 
rolled up on a warm day; (6) when the defendant opened up his 
door he exhaled smoke which the officer smelled and recognized as 
having the odor of marijuana; (7) the officer observed that the 
defendant's eyes were very bloodshot and that his speech was 
slow. Id. at 440-43. 
In sum, there was evidence of the manner of use consistent 
with a controlled substance, there was a visual identification of 
the use, there was an olfactory identification of the odor of 
marijuana, and there was evidence of the physical effects of use. 
The court found this evidence to be sufficient to establish the 
corpus delicti. Id. at 442. 
In contrast, the sparsity of the evidence in the case at bar 
provides a marked difference from that evidence found sufficient 
to establish the corpus delicti in Spotts. There was no evidence 
of use nor of odor nor of physical effects. The only evidence 
was the state toxicology report and Officer Schowfs statement 
that the white powder was "consistent with" cocaine. However, 
the state toxicology report was shown above to have been 
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erroneously admitted as unreliable hearsay, and Officer Schowfs 
observation was not an opinion about what the powder was, but 
merely Mwhat it might be...could possibly be." See Tr. 17. 
No case on corpus delicti law has been found to date 
discussing the effect of such a de minimis proffer of evidence. 
Thus, Defendant here asserts that evidence about what a substance 
"might be" is not clear and convincing evidence of what the 
substance is. Consequently, the judge's conclusion that 
sufficient independent evidence was shown to justify the 
admission of Defendant's alleged statement that the substance was 
cocaine was erroneous. Defendant's alleged admission should 
therefore be excluded from the determination as to whether 
sufficient admissible evidence was adduced at the preliminary 
hearing to bind over defendant on the drug possession charge. 
D. Officer Schow's Opinion That The White Powder 
Was HCon$iytenfr With" gpcain? E^pked 
Foundation And Was Insufficient To Prove That 
Thq g^bstange In Qyggtion Wag Cpg»ingt 
Officer Schow's testimony was merely a suspicion and was 
insufficient to prove that the substance at issue in this case 
was cocaine. Officer Schow testified that he observed a baggie 
containing white powder in the possession of Officer Findlay. 
Tr. 16. Officer Schow testified that he saw the baggie from 
"within a couple of feet," and that it was "consistent with" what 
he had previously seen as cocaine. Tr. 16-17. Counsel for 
defendant objected that insufficient foundation for an opinion 
had been established. Tr. 16. Officer Schow admitted that there 
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had been times in his experience when he had observed white 
powder that turned out to be baking soda instead of cocaine. Tr. 
18. Officer Schow testified that his training included the 
performance of chemical tests to determine "to test for drugs," 
and agreed that he preferred to use such tests when he could, but 
that he did not perform any such test in this case. Tr. 18-
19. In fact, apparently, Officer Schow himself never even took 
possession of the powder. Tr. 18. 
In response to Defendant's foundational objection, the 
prosecutor clarified the scope and import of the testimony he was 
seeking to elicit, stating: MYour honor, I'm just asking based 
on his training and experience, what it might be here, could 
possibly be. I'm not asking him to state categorically what it 
is." Tr. 17 (emphasis added). 
If the toxicology report from the Utah State Crime 
Laboratory is excluded as previously urged by Defendant, Officer 
Schow's speculation about the white powder is all that remains in 
evidence as to the nature of the white powder. Defendant urges 
this court to find that this mere speculation is insufficient 
evidence of the crime of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, and to quash the bindover of that charge. 
CONCLUSION 
The State failed to establish by competent evidence that the 
substance purported possessed by Mr. Rodriguez-Lopi in this case 
was a controlled substance. Mr. Rodriguez-Lopi therefore 
21 
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requests that this Court quash the bindover and dismiss the 
charge of possession of a controlled substance. 
DATED t h i s pft7< day of July, 1996. 
WWMJV*™ 
RALPH DELLAPIANA 
Attorney for Defendant 
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Dlstria Attorney, 231 East 
^ ^ 
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this r'r day of July, 1996. * 
•\ 
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ADDENDUM C 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, 4931 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
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IN THE TfflRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI, 
Defendant. 
: • ' : • • • - - = • . 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
) OF LAW 
) 
) CaseNo.961901205FS 
' Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover, Motion to Suppress Evidence Due to Lack of 
Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Defendant's Vehicle, Motion to Suppress Evidence Due to Illegal 
Search c I ID Vehicle, Motion to Suppress Evidence Due to Illegal Search 
Defendant's Person and Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statements to Law Enforcement 
Officers, filed in the above-entitled matter, came on for hearing before the Court 
1996, at 1:30 p.m. Defendant was present and represented by counsel, Ralph Dellapiana, Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association, and the State of Utah was represented by Kenneth R. 
Updegrove, Deputy District Attorney. 
In his Motion to Quash Bindover, defendant alleges that plaintiffs introduction of the 
Utah Crime Laboratory toxicology report to establish the substance defendant possessed was, in 
fact, a innlnillfil MiliMdin i, w.,!1 iiiiiilinisMhlr lieais*!, Because of the inadmissible hearsay, 
Magistrate's bindover at the preliminary hearing was erroneous as to the charge of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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In his Motion to Suppress Evidence Due to Lack of Reasonable Suspicion to Stop 
Defendant's Vehicle, he alleges the law enforcement officers had no indications defendant had 
committed or was in the act of committing a public offense when his vehicle was stopped. 
In his Motion to Suppress Evidence Due to Illegal Search of Defendant's Vehicle, 
defendant alleges the law enforcement officers' actions were not justified at their inception and 
that the officers' warrantless search of his vehicle was without probable cause and exigent 
circumstances to do so. 
In his Motion to Suppress Evidence Due to Illegal Search of Defendant's Person, he 
alleges the law enforcement officers did not have a reasonable belief that defendant was armed 
and dangerous plus the search exceeded the scope of a pat-down that would be necessary to 
discover weapons. 
In his Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statements to Law Enforcement Officers, he 
alleges that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of being informed of 
his constitutional rights per Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
Being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That defendant was charged by Information with Count I, Unlawful Possession of 
a Controlled Substance; Count II, Carrying Loaded Firearm in Vehicle; and Count III, Open 
Container. 
2. That the Information was based upon criminal activity which took place at 
approximately 5:00 a.m. on May 19,1996, on 1525 South State Street, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
( '- C r ^ 
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3. That Salt Lake City Police Officers Schow and Farris observed a truck being 
driven northbound on South State Street. 
4. That the truck was being driven off the roadway near the curb and was proceeding 
at 10 mph in a 35 mph zone. 
5. That two ladies, known to Officer Far 
sidewalk in the same direction as the truck was being driven. 
6. That the passenger was leaning out of the passenger window of the truck in the 
direction of the ladies. 
I. That the driver was leaning across the truck towards the passenger's side. 
8. That Officer Schow pulled in behind the truck and activated the overhead lights 
on his patrol vehicle. 
9. That the truck did not immediately stop but continued on for "as much as a block 
or so" before stopping. 
•10. That there were two persons in the truck. 
II. That prior to the truck stopping, Officer Schow observed the persons therein 
"moving around, seemed to be bending do vu i, knm nf fra/iln tilt, a.>. il miry v.nr iiiumi}.1 
something under the seat or 
12. That Officer Schow approached the driver's side of the truck and Officer Farris 
approached from the passenger's side. 
13. That defendant was the driver. 
14. That Officer Schow asked defendant to step out of the truck. 
15. That Officer Schow noticed an open bottle of beer in the truck. 
16. That Officer Farris noticed a firearm in the truck and ordered defendant to put his 
hands in the air. 
0 o r \ « •? 
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17. That defendant did not put his hands up and Officer Farris took him to the ground 
and handcuffed him. 
18. That the passenger was also handcuffed. 
19. That a .357 revolver, loaded with six rounds, was removed from the vicinity of the 
driver's position. 
20. That, while defendant was on the ground, backup Officer Findlay noticed a plastic 
baggie, partially exposed, in defendant's shirt pocket 
21. That Officer Findlay noticed a white, powdery substance in the bag. 
22. That Officer Schow testified as to his experience with controlled substances 
enforcement and stated the white, powdery substance was consistent with cocaine. 
23. That Officer Findlay asked defendant what was in the bag and the latter responded 
that it was cocaine. 
24. That defendant was not warned of his constitutional rights per Miranda before 
being questioned about the substance in the baggie. 
25. That before the Utah Crime Laboratory toxicology report was admitted into 
evidence, the police officers testified that it both concerned the named defendant and had the 
correct police report number thereon. 
CONCLUSIONS QF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that: 
1. The Magistrate at the preliminary hearing properly admitted the Utah Crime 
Laboratory toxicology report as reliable hearsay. 
2. Because of Conclusion Number 1, the bindover was proper and this Court has 
jurisdiction over the above-entitled matter. 
r f .* * •*
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3. The law enforcement officers could properly stop defendant's motor vehicle 
because the former observed the defendant commit a traffic offense. 
4 The law enforcement officers could properly stop defendant's motor vehicle 
because the totality of the circumstances the former observed indicated they had reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to believe a public offense was being committed and that defendant would 
leave the scene. 
seized because they were in plain view of the law enforcement officers who were lawfully 
present. 
6. I he baggie of controlled substance was properly seized by law enforcement 
officers as it was in plain view. It could also have been seized pursuant to a search of defendant 
after his lawful arrest for the crimes charged in Counts II and III. 
7. Defendant's statement that the baggie contained cocaine should be suppressed 
because defendant was being subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of being 
informed of his constitutional rights per Miranda. 
DATED this yhjJdSv of iJt7. ,1996 
/ BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
Ralph Dellapiana 
Counsel for Defendant 
. * o «••> 
•'. <x (\ ' ° 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo.961901205FS 
Page 6 
CKRTTFirATP.OFMAn.INn 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law was mailed to Ralph Dellapiana, counsel for Defendant Nelson Rodriguez-
Lopi, by placing it in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this day of 
September, 1996. 
my 
0 f. C- '• 2 ' 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, 4931 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- 961901205FS 
j 
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI, Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant. 
The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law and having entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law based thereon; 
HEREBY ORDERS that: 
1. The Motion to Quash Bindover is denied. 
2. The Motion to Suppress Evidence Due to Lack of Reasonable Suspicion to Stop 
Defendant's Vehicle is denied. 
3. The Motion to Suppress Evidence Due to Illegal Search of Defendant's Vehicle is 
denied. 
4. The Motion to Suppress Evidence Due to Illegal Search of Defendant's Person is 
denied. 
5. The Motiiui In ' ess Defendant's Statements to Law Enforcement Officers is 
HLED DISTRICT CfX*>T 
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ORDER 
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granted. 
DATED this 
A f f ' *• 
ORDER 
CaseNo.961901205FS 
Page 3 
CERTmriATF. OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed t< 
Dellapiana, counsel for Defendant Nelson Rodriguez-Lopi, by placing it in the U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, and addressed to Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, 
0 0 0 1 : 
ADDENDUM D 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
Art I, 5 9 CONSTITUTION Ml UTAH 664 
It) person* charged with any other crime, designated 
by atatute ae one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
aubatantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the pereon 
would constitute a aubatantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or ii likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. lasscsBdaa.) 
S a c 9. [Exoeeaive bail and fine* — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor ahall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned ahall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. isse 
S a c 10. [THalbyJury.l 
In capital cases the right of trial by Jury ahall remain 
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, exeept in capital 
caaes, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior 
Jurisdiction a jury shall oonsist of four jurors. In criminal cases 
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of 
the jurors may find a verdict. A'jury in civil eases ahall be 
waived unless demanded. tsee 
[Trial by Jury.] [Proposed.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury ahall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury ahall oonsist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
ahall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
ahall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
case* the verdict ahall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict A jury in civil cases 
ahall be waived unless demanded. ties*] 
Sac 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.) 
AU courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in hif person, property or reputation, ahall have 
remedy by du* oourse of law, which ahall be administered 
without atn>t< or unnecessary delsy, and no person ahall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party lass 
S a c 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the cffente is alleged to hMve been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instanoe shall any 
aoeuaed person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or feet to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The aoeuaed ahall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wile ahall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any pereon 
be twioe put in Jeopardy for the same offense. 
* Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution ahall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. i s * 
S e c l& fProeec urJon by information or indictment -
Grand Jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, ahall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the aoeuaed with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit. 
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
dutieethereofshail be M prescribed by the Legislature, wi 
S a c 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant] 
Hie right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seixurei 
ahall not be violated; and no warrant ahall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. ISM 
S e c i& [Fiwadom of speech and of the press—Libel] 
No law ahall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous ii true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party ahall be acquitted; and the jury ahall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact imi 
8 e c 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
T^ere ahall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
abaconding debtors. ISM 
S a c 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
ahall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. 8oldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. isss 
S a c 16. [Attainder — Ex poat facto lawa — Impairing 
oontracte.] 
No bill of attainder, ex poat facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed im 
S a c If. [Traason defined — Proo' 
Reason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to Ha enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act iset 
8 e c SO. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military ahall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered is 
any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war 
exeept ins manner to be prescribed by law, m$ 
S a c I I . [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as • 
punishment for crime, whereof the party ahall have been duly 
convicted, ahall exist within this State. 11< 
S a c SS. rPrivaU property for public u s e ] 
Private property ahall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just eompenaation. 
S e c 18. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law ahall be paased granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity H* 
S e c S4. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature ahall have uniform operation. 
Utah R. Crim. Pro. 7(h)(2) 
Rule 8 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6 >i 
(d) The magistrate having jurisdiction ever the offense 
charged shall, upon the defendant's first appearance before 
frtwi, inform the defendant: 
(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and 
furnish a copy to him; 
(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in 
eupport of the information and how to obtain them; 
(8) of Ms right to retain counsel or have counsel ap-
pointee m the oourt without expense to him if he is 
unable to obtain his own counsel; 
(4) of his right* concerning pretrial release, including 
bail; and 
(6) that he is sot required to make any statement, and 
that the statements he does make may be used against 
him in a oourt of law. 
(e) The magistrate shall, after providing the information 
under paragraph (d) and before proceeding further, allow the 
defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel 
and shall allow him to contact any attorney by any reasonable 
means, without delay and without fee. 
(f) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, 
the magistrate shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea. 
(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sen-
tenced by the magistrate as provided by law. 
(2) Ifthe pies is not guilty, atrial date shall be set The 
date may not be extended except for good cause shown. 
Trial shall be held under these rules and law applicable to 
criminal cases. 
(g) (1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he may not 
be called on to enter a plea before the ormrniitting magis-
trate. During the initial appearance before the magis-
trate, the defendant shall be advised of his right to a 
preliminary examination. If the defendant waives his 
right to a preliminary examination, and the preoemting 
attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the defen-
dant bound ever to answer in the district court. 
(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary 
examination, the magistrate shall achedule the prelimi-
nary examination. The examination shall be held within a 
reasonable time, but not later than tan days if the 
defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not 
later than 80 days if he is not in custody. Tneee time 
periods may be extended by the magistrate for good cause 
shown. A preliminary oxsminstion may not be held ifthe 
demdant is indicted, 
(b) (InA preliminary examination shall be held under the 
rules and laws applicable to criminal cases triad before a 
court The state has the burden of proof and shall proceed 
first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the 
defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and 
present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine 
the witnesses against him. 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable 
cause to believe that the crime charged has been commit-
ted and that the defendant has committed it, the magis-
trate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound 
over to answer in the district oourt Tbe findings of 
probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in 
part Objections to evidenos en the ground that it was 
acquired by unlawftil means are not property raised at the 
preliminary **—'U^tion. 
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to 
believe that the crime charged has been oommitted or that 
the defendant oommitted it, the magistrate shall dismiss 
the information and discharge the defendant The magis-
trate may enter findings offset, conclusions of law, and an 
order of dismissal The dismissal and discharge do not 
preclude the state from instituting a subsequent proeecu-
tion for the same offense. 
(i) At a preliminary oxaminstion, the magistrate, upon 
request of cither party, m*y exclude witnesses from the 
courtroom and may require witnesses not to converse with 
each other until the preliminary examination is concluded On 
the request of either party, the magistrate may order all 
spectators to be excluded from the oourtroom. 
(J) (1) Ifthe magistrate orders the defendant bound over to 
the district court, the magistrate shall execute in writing 
a bind-over order and shall transmit to the clerk of the 
district oourt all pleadings in and records made of the 
proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, 
recordings, and any typewritten transcript. 
(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the 
custody of the sheriff, the magistrate shall execute the 
appropriate commitment order. 
00 (1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that 
any material witness in a case pending before him will not 
appear and testify unless bond is required, he may fix a 
bond with or without sureties, and in a sum he consider! 
adequate, for the eppearanoe of the witness. 
(2) If the witness foils or refuses to post the bond with 
the clerk of the court, the magistrate may commit him to 
jail until he complies or is otherwise legally discharged 
(3) Ifthe witness does provide bond when required, he 
may be examined and cross-examined before the magis-
trate in the presence of the defendant and his testimony 
•hall be recorded. He shall then be discharged. 
<A) If the witness ia unavailable or foils to appear it 
any subsequent hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the 
recorded testimony may be used at the hearing or trial in 
heu of the personal testimony of the witness. 
(Amended affective May 1,1993.) 
Rule & Appointment of oouneeL 
(a) A defendant charged with e public offense has the right 
to self representation, and if indigent, has the right to court-
appointed counsel if the defendant fooes a substantial prob-
ability of deprivation of liberty. 
Cb) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent 
en indigent defendant who is charged with an offense for 
which the punishment may be death, the court shall appoint 
two or mors attorneys to represent such defendant and shall 
make a finding on the record based on the requirements set 
forth below that appointed counsel is proficient in the trial of 
capital cases. In making its determination, the court shall 
ensure that the experience of counsel who are under consid-
eration for appointment have met the following minimum 
requirementa: 
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have 
tried to verdict §a felony esses within the past four yean 
or twenty-five felony cases total; 
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have 
appeared as counsel or co-counsel in e capital or a felony 
homicide ease which was tried to a jury and which went to 
final verdict; 
(8) et least one of the appointed ettorneys must have 
completed or taught within the past five years an ap-
proved continuing legal education course or courses st 
least eight hours of which deal, in substantial part, with 
the trial of death penalty cases; and 
(4) the experience of one of the eppointed attorney* 
must total not less than five years in the active practiot of 
law. 
(c) In making Hs selection of attorneys for appointment ins 
capital case, the court should also consider at least the 
following factors: 
(1) whether one or mors of the attorneys under consid-
eration have previously appeared as counsel or co-counsel 
in a capital case; 
Utah R. Evid. 803(8) 
14' UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 803 
ARTICLE VH OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
Bala 701. Opinion testimony by lay' 
If the witness it not testifying aa an expert, tha witness' 
taetimony in the form of opinions or inferences ie limited to 
those opinions or inferences which a n (a) rationally baaed on 
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a dear 
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination 
ofsfact in issue. 
(Amended effective October 1,1992.) 
Rale 702. Testimony by expert*. 
If adentific, technical, or other specialised knowledge will 
ossist the trier of Out to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tas-
tiftr thereto in the ten of an opinion or otherwise. 
Rale 708. Baaas of opinion testimony by expert*. 
The fact* or data in the particular case upon which an 
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those pomivodby 
or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field 
fa forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
dsts need not be admissible in evidence. 
(Amended effective October 1,1992.) 
Bale 704. Opinion on ultimate toeae. 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), taetimony in 
the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admiasible is not 
objectionable because H embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental 
stats or condition of s defendant in a criminal eaee may state 
an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did 
not have the mental state or condition constituting an element 
of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate 
issues are matters fur the trier of fact alone. 
(Amended effective October 1,1992.) 
Rule 70S. Diecloeuro of facts or data undertyinf expert 
opinion. 
Ilis expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and 
give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underly-
ing nuts or data, unless the court requires otherwise, l i e 
expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying 
feet* or data en eroee-cxamination. 
(Amended effective October 1,1992.) 
Rale TOO. Court-appointed < 
(a) Appointment The court may on its own motion or or> 
the motion of any party enter an order to show cause WE; 
expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request 
the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any 
expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint 
expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall 
aot be appointed by the court unless the witness consents to 
set A witness eo appointed shall be informed of the witness9 
duties by the court in writing, a copy of which ehall be tied 
oith the dark, or at a conference in which the partiaa ahaQ 
lavs opportunity to pertidpate. A witnees so appointed shall 
•Wee the parties of the witness* findings, if any, the witDces' 
•position may be taken by *ay party; and the witnees may be 
•Bed to testily by the court or any party. Ibe witnees ahaD be 
•abject to cms-examination by each party, tntluding a party 
•lung the witnees. 
<b) Compensation. Expert witnesses eo appointed are 
•titled to reasonable compensation in whatever earn the 
•art may allow. The compensation thus fixed is payable from 
fcndi which may be provided by law in criminal easea and civil 
*aons and proceedings involving just compesation under the 
Fifth Amendment In other dvil actions an? proceeding* the 
QUIHiosifirm shall be paid by the parties in such proportion 
and at such time as the court direct, and thereafter charged in 
Mke manner as other coats. 
(c) Diacloeure of appointment In the exercise of it* 
discretion, the court may authorise diacloeure to the jury of 
the fact that tha court appointed the expert witness. 
(d) Parties' experts of own eelection Nothing in this 
rale teats the parties in calling expert witaeesss of their own 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 
ARTICLE V I E HEARSAY. 
Eule 901. Definitions* 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement A •statement* is (1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of e person, if it is 
intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant, A "declarant" is a person who makes a 
ftatement 
(c) Baareay. "Hearsay* is a statement, ether than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
bearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter aesertcd. 
(d) jtatementa which are aot hearsay. A statement 
la not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witneea. Tne dedarant 
tea tines at the trial or bearing and is subject to 
rmei sisminstion concerning the statement and the 
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's 
testimony or the witnees denies having made the 
etatement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an 
express or implied charge against the dedarant of 
recent fabrication or improper infiuence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admiaeion by party-opponent Hie state-
ment is offered against a party and is (A) the party's 
own statement» la either an individual or a represen-
tative canadty, or (B) a etatement of which the party 
has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or 
(C) a statement by a person authorised by the party 
to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) s 
etatement by the partyt agent or asrvant concerning 
a matter within the scope of the agency or employ-
ment, aiade during the existence of the relationship, 
or C£) a statement by e coconspirator of a party 
during the course and in fturtherenee of the con-
epiracy. 
CAmended effective October 1,1992.) 
Bale 902. Hearsay rale. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by 
rules. 
Bale 80ft. Hearsay axoeptiona; availability of declarant 
Immaterial 
Ibe following are aot exduded by the hearsay nils, even 
though the declarant is available as a witness: 
a ) Pfooant eenee tmpreeeion, A statement describ-
ing or explaining an event or condition made while the 
dedarant was perceiving the event or condition or imme-
diately thereafter. 
(9) Bxclted atteraaon, A etatement relating to e 
•tartling event or condition made while the declarant was 
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition 
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(8) Them wi l t ing mesial, emotional, or physical 
condition. A statement of the declarant's thon editing 
«t%te of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical oondition 
foacb at intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, 
**a*f bodily botlth), but not tochidmc * sUtement of 
miiiiury or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed 
raises it ralatee to the execution, revocation, identifica-
tion, or tarxm of declarants will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical dtogrt^f** 
• f traatment 8tatemanti made for purpoeee of medical 
diagnoeif or treatment and rteerrihing medical history, or 
PMt or preeent symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the 
mteption or general character of the cense or external 
eouree thereof insofar ae reasonably pertinent to diagno-
•ie or treatment 
Co) Recorded recollect loui A memorendum or record 
oobceniing a matter about which a witneat eoee had 
knowledge but now hat ineuffieient recollection to enable 
th% witneet to testify fully and accurately, ehown to have 
been made or adopted by the witneet when the matter 
wi i fresh in the witneet' memory and to reflect that 
knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or 
moord may be read into evidence but may sot itself be 
revived at an exhibit unleet offered by tn adverae party. 
(€) Reoordt of regularly eondueted activity. A 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any 
fc*m, of actt, events, oonditiont, opiniont or diagnoeet, 
made at or near the time by, or from information trans-
mitted by, e pereon with knowledge, if kept in the oouree 
of e regularly conducted butineet activity, and if it wet 
t&t regu/ar practice of that business activity to make the 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all at 
•h^wn by the teetimony of the cuttodian or other qualified 
witneet, unleet the eouroe of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthy 
aeet. The term "butineet" at need in thit paragraph 
includes butineet, institution, associstion, profession, ec-
**bstion, and calling of every kind, whether or not con-
ducted for profit. 
(7) Aheenoe of entry hi reoordt kept la accor-
dance with the provisions of Paragraph (6). Evi-
dence that a matter it not included in the memoranda, 
mperte, reoordt, or data oompilationt, in any fbrm, kept in 
oo^ordanoe with the proviaiont of Paragraph (6), to prove 
the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the 
abetter waa of a kind of which a memorandum* report, 
record, or data compilation wet regularly made and 
preserved, tmleea the oouroot of information or ether 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthinees. 
(6) Public reoordt and reporta. Reoordt, reports, 
statements, or data oompilationt, in any form, of public 
offices or agenciet, totting forth (A) the activities of the 
office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty 
imposed by law at to which matters there was a duty to 
report, excluding, however, in criminal oaaes matters 
observed by police officers and ether lew enforcement 
JKShaonnel, or tC) in rivi) actions and pmsedtojoi and 
ogftJnst the Ocvemment to criminal oases, factual find-
ings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law, unless the sources of informa-
tion or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthy 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data com-
pilations, to any form, of births, fotal deaths, deaths, or 
marriages, if the report thereof was mads to a public efltee 
pujvuant to requirements of lew. 
(10) Aheenoe ofpublto record or eotr* lb prove the 
*bt*nos of a record, report, statement, or data compile-
ttoh, to any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of 
• metier of which a record, report, statement, or diu 
compilation in any form, was regularly made and pr* 
•trved by e public office or agency, evidence in the km of 
• certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, 
that diligent mtrch hiiod to iioeiooe the moard* ttpon, 
statement, or data compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organisation. Statement* 
of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, tnou-
try relationship by blood or marriage, or other aiznilar 
frets of personal or family history, contained in s regu-
tarty kept record of e religious organisation. 
(12) laarriage, baptismal, and similar oertificsUA. 
Statements of fact contained in e certificate that the 
Maker performed e marriage or other ceremony or sdmin-
sstered e sacrament, made by • clergyman, public officii], 
or ether person authorised by the rules or practical oft 
religious organisation or by law to perform the act eerti. 
fied,andpuiportingtohsvebseniss^stthetimeofthe 
•fit or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(18) Family records. Statements of met concerning 
ptrsonal or family history contained in family Bibles, 
genealogies, charts, engrsvings on rings, inscription* on 
fomily portraits, engrevingt on urns, crypts, or tomb-
atones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an Interest 
la property* The record of e document purporting to 
aetablisb or affect an interest in property, as proof of the 
oontent of the original recorded document and its execu-
tion and delivery by each person by whom it purport* to 
have been executed, if the record is e record of s public 
odJce and an appuosbie statute eut&onxes the feoorrfing 
of documentt of that kind to thst office. 
(16) Statements to documents affecting an inter* 
• t fa property* A statement contained in a document 
purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if 
the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the 
document, unless dealings with the property since the 
document was made have been inconsistent with the 
truth of the statement or the purport of the document. 
(16) Statements to ancient documents, Statementi 
*» a document to eristenoe twenty years or more the 
authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. 
Market quotations, tabulstiont, hats, directories, or other 
published compilations, generally used and relied upon by 
th% public or by persons to particular occupstiont. 
(16) L e a n e d Creettoes. lb the extent called to the 
attention of an expert witness upon cross-exsminsticm or 
raUed upon by the expert witness in direct examinstion, 
abatements contained to published trestises, periodical!, 
or pamphlets on e subject of history, medicine, or other 
•dence or art, established as a reliable authority by the 
teetimony or admission of the witness or by other expert 
testimony er by judicial notice. If admitted, the ttste-
m%nts may be read into evidence but may not be received 
as exhibits. 
OP) Reputation eoBcornhif poroonM) or femHf 
•Ufetoix Reputation among members of s persons family 
ky blood, adoption, er marriage, er among a persons 
gfrjociatao, er to the community, concerning e persons 
With, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, tegitimscy, re-
lationship by blood, adoption, er marriage, ancestry, er 
•fter similar act of jereonal or family history. 
40 ) Reputation oonoerning boundaries or gen-
t r t l history. Reputation to a community arising before 
tb* controversy, es to boundaries of or customs affsctinf 
ItXids to the community, and reputation as to events of 
general history important to the community or State or 
Bfttioo to which located. 
Utah R.Evid. 1101(5) 
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ARTICLE X* CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, 
RECORDINGS, AND 
PHOTOGRAPHS. 
Role 1001. Definition*. 
For purpooe* of thii article the following definition! are 
applicable: 
(1) Writing* and recordings, "writings* and •record-
ing** consist of letter*, words, or number*, or their equiva-
lent, eet down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, 
photoetating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechani-
cal or electronic recording, or other form of data compila-
tion. 
(2) Photograph*, •Photograph*" include etill photo-
graph*, X-ray film*, video tape*, and motion picture*. 
(3) Original An •originaJ* of a writing or recording i* 
the writing or recording iteelf or any counterpart intended 
to have the aame effect by a person executing or iaeuing i t 
An 'original" of a photograph include* the negative or any 
print therefrom If data are atored in a computer or 
ahnilar device, any printout or other output readable by 
eight, shown to reflect the data accurately, i* an •original." 
(4) Duplicate. A •duplicate* i* a counterpart produced 
by the aame impreaaion a* the original, or from the aame 
matrix, or by mean* of photography, including enlarge-
ment* and miniature*, or by mechanical or electronic 
re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other 
equivalent technique* which accurately reproduce the 
original. 
Rule 1002. Requirement of original 
lb prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, 
the original writing, recording, or photograph i* required, 
except a* otherwise provided in theee rule* or by other rule* 
adopted by the Supreme Court of thi* State or by 8tatute. 
Rob 100S. Admi»*Ibtlity of duplicate*. 
A duplicate i* admissible to the same extent as an original 
unlet* (l) a genuine question i* raised a* to the authenticity of 
the original or (2) in the circumstance* it would be unfair to 
admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. 
Bui* 1001 Admi»*ibilitycrfother evidence of oontont*. 
The original i* not required, and other evidence of the 
content* of e writing, recording, or photograph is admiasible if: 
(1) Original* loot or dee troy » d All original* are loot 
or have been destroyed, unleee the proponent lost or 
destroyed them in bad faith; or 
(2) Original not obtainable. No original can be ob-
tained by any available judicial prooeea or procedure; or 
(8) Original in poeaeaeion of opponent At a time 
when an original was under the control of the party 
against whom offered, that party was put on notice, by the 
pleadings or otherwise, that the content would be a 
eubjecyof proof at the hearing, and that party does not 
produce the original at the hearing; or 
(4> JboUMtsra) maUon. The writing, roctrr&'mg, or 
photograph ig not doeely related to a controlling isaue. 
Ctotoded effective October 1,1902.) 
Bn2% 1005. Public record*. 
11je content* of an official record, or of a document autho-
rised to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed, 
including data compilation* in any form, if otherwise admis-
sible, may be proved by copy, certified as correct in accordance 
with Rule 902 or testified to be correct by a witne** who ha* 
oompamf it with the origin*!. If* oopy which armplies with 
the foregoing cannot be obtained by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, then other evidence of the content* may be given. 
Role 1006. Summariee. 
Die content* of voluminou* writing*, recordings, or photo-
graph* which cannot conveniently be examined in court may 
be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. 
The originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for 
examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reason-
able time and place. The court may order that they be 
produced in court. 
Rule 1007. Ibetimony or written admieaion of party. 
Content* of writings, recordings, or photograph* may be 
proved by the testimony or deposition of the party against 
whom offered or by that party's written admission, without 
accounting for the nonproduction of the original. 
(Amended effective October 1,1992.) 
Rule 1008. Functions of court and Jury. 
When the admiesibility of other evidence of content* of 
writing*, recordings, or photographs under theee rule* de-
pond* upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the question 
whether the condition has been fulfilled is ordinarily for the 
ooun to determine in accordance with the provisions of Rule 
104, However, when an iasue i* raised (a) whether the as-
sorted writing ever *xiMtedt or (b) whether another writing, 
recording, or photograph produced at the trial i* the original, 
or (Q) whether other evidence of content* correctly reflect* the 
content*, the iacue i* for the trier offset to determine as in the 
case of other iaaue* of fact. 
ARTICLE XL MISCELLANEOUS RULES. 
Rule 1101. Applicability of rule*. 
(a) Court* and magistrate*. Theee rule* apply to all 
•ction* and proceedings in the court* of thi* state except as 
otherwise provided in Subdivision (b). 
(b) Rule* inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect 
to privilege*) do not apply in the following situations: 
(1) Preliminary questions of fact which are to be deter-
mined under Rule 104(a); 
(2) Grand jury proceedings; 
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, eentenc-
ing or granting or revocation of probation, issuance of 
warrant* for arrest, criminal summonses and search 
warrant* and proceedings with respect to release on bail 
or otherwise; 
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act 
summarily; 
(6) In a preliminary examination, nothing in these 
rule* shall be construed to prevent the admission of 
reliable hearsay evidence. 
(Amended effective January 1,1995.) 
R o b 1101. [Reserved.] 
R u b 1103. Htle. 
I^eae rule* may be known and cited aa the Utah Rule* of 
Evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44.5,41-6-44.10,41-6-45 and 
41-6-61 (1993 and Supp. 1997) 
41-6-44.5 MOTOR VEHICLES 
History: C. 1953, 41444.4, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 78, | 2; 1993, ch. 83, t 1; 1993, eh. 
234, t 33. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment by ch. 83, effective May 3, 1993, added 
Subsection (1) and redesignated the remaining 
subsections accordingly and made related 
changes; inserted "Driver License" preceding 
"Division" throughout the section; rewrote 
Subsection (2Ma), deleting a reference to Sub-
section 41-6-44(2); inserted "of the Department 
of Public Safety" in Subsection (2Xb)(iiMA); 
substituted "Driver License Division" for "de-
partment" in Subsection (2XcMii); inserted 
"driver" in Subsection (6Xa); substituted "Sec-
tion 32A-12-209" for "Section 31 A-12-209" in 
Subsection (7XaXi); inserted "operator" in Sub-
section (8Kb); deleted "of the Department of 
Public Safety" following "Division" and "as de-
fined in Section 62A-8-101" following "author-
ity" in Subsection (HXa); and substituted "op-
erator license" for "driver license" or for "li-
cense" in Subsection (HXbXi). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 234, effective 
July 1, 1993, added Subsections (lXaXi) and 
(ii), (lXc), and (7Xh); rewrote Subsection (2Xa), 
deleting a citation to Subsection 41-6-44(2); 
substituted "30th day" for "31st day" twice in 
Subsection (2XbXii); added "of the Department 
of Public Safety" in Subsection (2Xb)(ii)(A); 
added "Driver License" throughout; substi-
tuted "29 days" for "30 days" in Subsection 
(7KaXi); updated the section citations to reflect 
the creation of Title 53; deleted "as defined in 
Section 62A-8-101" after "authority" in Sub-
section (HXs); substituted "operator license" 
for "driver license" in Subsection (HXbXi); and 
made stylistic and designation changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1993, ch. 83 J 2 
provides that if both that act and Laws 1993, 
ch. 234 pass, then Section 41-6-44.4 of ch. 234 
is amended to delete Subsection (lXa) and in-
sert Subsection (lXa) of ch. 83, to delete Sub-
section (lXc) referencing § 41-6-44, and to de-
lete Subsection (2Xa) and insert Subsection 
(2Xa) of ch. 83. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 78 be-
came effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions 
for driving under the influence — Weight of evi-
dence. 
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material 
to prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcoho! or drugs or with a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily proks&fted. the results of a chemical 
test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evi-
dence. 
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 
does not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of a 
defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible 
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the alleged 
driving or actual physical control, the test result is admissible as evidence of 
the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the alleged operating 
or actual physical control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight is 
given to the result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissi-
ble evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at 
the time of the alleged operating or actual physical control. 
History: C. 1*53,41-6-444, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 343,1 3; L. 1963, eh. 99,1 16; 1967, 
eh. 136, I 39; 1993, eh. 161, • 1. 
Repeals and Reenectmeots. — Lews 1979, 
ch. 243, I 3 repealed former i 41-644.5, as 
last amended by L. 1977, ch. 270, i 1, relating 
to chemical tests as evidence and the presump-
tion of blood alcohol level, and enacted present 
I 41-6-44.5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, subdivided Sub-
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(2) alleged violations of Section 53-3-227, which consist of the person 
operating a vehicle while the person's driving privilege is suspended or 
revoked for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complied 
with the requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 
76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the person was charged with 
violating as a result of a plea bargain after having been originally charged 
with violating one or more of those sections or ordinances. 
History: C. 1953,41-6-44.8, enacted by L. "Subsection 41«6-44(6XaXii)* in Subsection (1) 
1983, ch. 102, t 1; 1987, ch. 138,1 40; 1990, and substituted "the persons driving privilege" 
ch. 299,1 2; 1991, ch. 147, f 2; 1993, ch. 234, for "his operator's license" Subsection (2). 
• 84; 1994, ch. 180, f 2; 1996, ch. 47, f 1; Tbe 1996 amendment by ch. 71, effective July 
1996, ch. 71, ft 2. 1,1996, substituted "Section 41-6-44" for "Sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- section 41-6-44(6KaXii) or Section 41-6-44.6" in 
ment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or Sec- Subsection (1). 
tion 41-6-44.6" at the end of Subsection (1). This section is set out as reconciled by the 
The 1996 amendment, by ch. 47, effective Office of Legislative Research and General 
April 29,1996, substituted "Section 41-6-44" for Counsel. 
41-6-44-10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol 
or drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning, 
report — Hearing, revocation of license —- Ap-
peal —• Person incapable of refusal — Results of 
test available — Who may give test — Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have 
given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine 
for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 53-3-231, while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any 
drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in 
violation of Section 41-6*44.6, if the test is or tests are administered at the 
direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have 
been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 
41-6-44 or 53-3-231, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while 
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any 
other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to 
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select 
the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any 
specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a 
peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or 
administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit 
to the requested test or tests. 
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(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested 
by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under 
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the 
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that 
a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the 
person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (a), if the person does not 
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace 
officer be administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf 
of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver License 
Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a 
motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of 
the Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver 
License Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing 
before the Driver License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by the 
Driver License Division, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after 
the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person 
had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under 
Section 41-6-44 or 53-3-231, while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while 
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that 
the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under 
Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's 
intention to revoke his license under this section is entitled to a 
hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten 
days after the date of the arrest. 
(iii) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written request for a 
hearing before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in 
the state is revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest 
for a period of: 
(A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction 
after July 1,1993, under this section, Section 41-6-44.6,53-3-223, 
or 53-3-231 or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under Section 
41-6-44. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the Driver 
License Division, the hearing shall be documented and shall cover the 
issues of. 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a 
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44, 
41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Notice to owner. 
While this section requires the motor vehicle 
division to provide notice to the impounded ve-
hicle's owner, this requirement is triggered 
only after the peace officer or agency by whom 
the officer is employed fulfills his or its manda-
tory duty to notify the division of the impound-
ment in the first place. Summers v. Utah, 927 
F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1991). 
41-6-45* Reckless driving 
History*. L. 1*41, ch . tt, 1 3&«, C. V*4S, 
57.7-112; L. 1978, ch. S3, ft 9; 1986, ch. 178, 
I 80; 1987, eh . 188,ft 44; 1987, ch. 904,ft 1. 
Am. Jar . 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic ft 312 et aeq. 
C A S . — 61A CJS. Motor Vehicles §* 609 
to 624. 
AJLR. — Validity, construction, and appli-
cation of criminal statutes specifically directed 
against racing of automobiles on public streets 
or highways (drag racing), 24 AJ*R.3d 1286. 
Vehicle owner's allegations that he was 
given no notice of any post-deprivation hearing 
 until after his vehicle had been sold plainly 
 implicated due process concerns, and city ofTi-
10  dais could not use this section as a shield to 
d*' deflect due process responsibility onto the state 
Ln
"^ motor vehicle division. Summers v. Utah, 927 
9 2 7
 FM 1165 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Penalty. 
' , nile court, I 78-3a-16. 
1. Sentencing for misdemeanors, ft$ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Liability of one fleeing police for injury re-
sulting from collision of police vehicle with an-
other vehicle, person, or object, 51 A.L.R.3d 
1226. 
Statute prohibiting reckless driving: defi-
nitenees and certainty, 52 A.L.R.4th 1161. 
Key Numbers . — Automobiles *» 330. 
(1) A person who operates any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the 
safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. 
(2) A person convicted of reckless driving is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor. Upon a first conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of imprison-
ment of not fewer than five days, or a minimum fine of not less than $25. On a 
second or subsequent conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of imprison-
ment of not fewer than ten days, or a minimum fine of not less than $50. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Former Jeopardy. untary manslaughter. State v. Empey, 65 Utah 
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving 609, 239 P. 25, 44 A.L.R. 558 (1925). 
did not bar a subsequent prosecution for in vol-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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41-6-61 MOTOR VEHICLES 
History: L. 1941, ch. 6% I 60; C. 1943, 
57-7-127; L. 1969, eh. 109,1 1; 1979, ch. 942, 
f 16; 1987, ch. 138, | 69. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
OJ.S. - 80 C J.S. Motor Vehicles t 16. 
Key Numbers. — Automobiles e» 14. 
41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes — Provisions 
— Traffic-control devices. 
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the 
following provisions apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely within a 
single lane and may not be moved from the lane until the operator has 
determined the movement can be made safely. 
(2) On a roadway divided into three lanes and providing for two-way 
movement of traffic, a vehicle may not be operated in the center lane 
except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the 
same direction, and when the center lane is clear of traffic within a 
safe distance; or 
(b) in preparation of making or completing a left turn or where the 
center lane is allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same 
direction that the vehicle is proceeding and the allocation is desig-
nated by official traffic-control devices. 
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing specified 
traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by 
traffic moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the 
roadway. Operators of vehicles shall obey the directions of these devices. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 82, I 51; C. 1943, 
67-7-128; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 907, 
I 18; 1978, ch. 83, f 14; 1987, ch. 188,1 60. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Violation as evidence of negligence. case. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 264 
Violation* of standards of safety set by etat- (D. Utah 1968), affd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 
ute are regarded as prima facie evidence of 1969). 
negligence subject only to justification or ex-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJS. — 60A C JJS. Motor Vehicles f 274. 
Key Numbers, — Automobiles e» 153. 
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187 LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TECHNICAL SERVICES 53-5-202 
PARTI 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TECHNICAL SERVICES 
DIVISION ADMINISTRATION 
53-5-104. Division duties. 
The division shall: 
(1) provide and coordinate the delivery of support services to law 
enforcement agencies; 
(2) maintain and provide access to criminal records for use by law 
enforcement agencies; 
(3) publish law enforcement and statistical data; 
(4) maintain dispatch and communications services for public safety 
communications centers and provide emergency medical, fire suppression, 
highway maintenance, public works, and law enforcement communica-
tions for municipal, county, state, and federal agencies; 
(5) analyze evidence from crime scenes and crime-related incidents for 
criminal prosecution; 
(6) provide criminalistic laboratory services to federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agencies, prosecuting attorneys'and agencies, and public 
defenders, with the exception of those services provided by the state 
medical examiner in accordance with Title 26, Chapter 4, Utah Medical 
Examiner Act; 
(7) establish satellite laboratories as necessary to provide criminalistic 
services; 
(8) safeguard the public through licensing and regulation of activities 
that impact public safety, including polygraph examiners, concealed 
weapons, emergency vehicles, security companies, and burglar alarm 
companies; 
(9) make rules to implement this chapter; and 
(10) perform the functions specified in this chapter. 
History: C. 1053,63-5-104, enacted by L. ment, effective May 2, 1994, deleted 
lf93, cb. 234, i 181; 1994, cb. 57, I 1. •moonwalker enterprises" after "security corn-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- panics * in Subsection (S). 
PART 2 
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 
53-5-202. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Administration of criminal justice" means performance of any of the 
following: detection, apprehension, detention, pretrial release, posttrial 
release, prosecution, adjudication, correctional supervision, or rehabilita-
tion of accused persons or criminal offenders. 
(2) "Conviction record" means criminal history information indicating a 
record of a criminal charge which has led to a declaration of guilt of an 
offense. 
(3) "Criminal history record information" means information on indi-
viduals consisting of identifiable descriptions and notations of: 
(a) arrests, detentions, indictments, informations, or other formal 
criminal charges, and any disposition arising from any of them; and 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1996) 
117 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 58-37-8 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXaXiv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1302 to 1305 
(1995 and Supp. 1996) 
76-10-1302 CRIMINAL CODE 
History: C. 1953, 76*10-1*03, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch- 196,1 76-10-1303; 19S7, eh. 192, 
I 1; 19SS, ch. 199,1 1. 
Croas-Referenoes. — Abatement of homes 
of prostitution. ( 47-1-1 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Massage parlor ordinances. 
Constitutionality. 
Former provision defining "sexual activity" to 
include "any touching of a person's clothed or 
unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, anus, 
or, if the person is s female, her breast, whether 
alone or between members of the same or 
opposite sex. or between humans and animals, 
in an act of apparent or actual sexual stimula-
tion or gratification" was unconstitutionally 
overbroad and vague. Ouinther v. Wilkinson, 
679 F. Supp. 1066 CD. Utah 1988). 
Massage parlor ordinances. 
State laws on prostitution and sex offenses 
did not preempt county or city from enacting 
ordinances prohibiting massages by members 
of the opposite sex, with certain exceptions, and 
prohibiting a masseur from touching or offering 
to touch or massage the genitalia of customers. 
Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County ComnVn, 
624 R2d 1138 (Utah 1981); Holhngsworth v. 
City of South Salt Lake, 624 R2d 1149 (Utah 
1981). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. Sd. — 63A Am. Jur. 2d Prostitution 
« 1. 
76-10-1302. Prostitution. 
(1) 
CAS. — 73 C JS. Prostitutitn S 2. 
Key Numbers. — Prostitution s* 1. 
A person is guilty of prostitution when: 
(a) he engages in any sexual activity with another person for a fee; 
(b) is an inmate of a house of prostitution; or 
(c) loiters in or within view of any public place for the purpose of being 
hired to engage in sexual activity. 
(2) Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor. However, any person who is 
convicted a second time, and on all subsequent convictions, under this section 
or under a local ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 76-10*1307 is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as provided in Section 76-10-1309. 
History C. 1953, 76-10*1802, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196,1 76-10-1302; 1991, eh. 107, 
I 1; 1993, ch. 179,1 f. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend* 
ment, effective April 29,1991, rewrote Subsec-
tion (2), which formerly read "Prostitution is a 
class B misdemeanor, provided that any person 
who is twice convicted under this section shall 
be guilty of a class A misdemeanor." 
Tne 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993, 
deleted "or offers or agrees to engage" after 
•engages" in Subsection (lXa) and added "ex-
cept as provided in Section 76-10-1909" to the 
end of Subsection (2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
AXALTBS 
Elements. 
Cited. 
Dements, 
The offense of prostitution is complete once 
there is an offer or agreement So engage in the 
sexual activity for a fee; it is unnecessary to 
actually engage m the eexual activity (decided 
before 1993 deletion of "or offers or agrees to 
engage"). State v. Holmes, 774 R2d 606 (Ct 
App. 1989). 
Cited in Ouinther v. Wilkinson, 679 F. Supp. 
1066 (D. Utah 1966). 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 76-10-1304 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. Sd. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Disorderly ^escort serviess," *outcall entertainment," or 
Houses { 2. similar service! need to cany on prostitution, 
CJ&. — 27 CJJ5. Disorderly Houses { 1 . 16 AJLRSth 900. 
A X J t — Lsws prohibiting or rsfulatinf Em? Numbers. — Disorderly House e» 2. 
76-10-1303. Patronizing a prostitute. 
(1) A person is guilty of patronizing a prostitute when: 
(a) he pays or offers or agrees to pay another person a fee for the 
purpose of engaging in an act of sexual activity; or 
0)) he enters or remains in a house of prostitution for the purpose of 
engaging in sexual activity. 
(2) Patronizing a prostitute is a class B misdemeanor, except as provided in 
Section 76-10-1309. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1808, enected by ment, effective May 3,1993, eubstituted "class 
L. 1978, ch. 196, | 76-10-1808; 1998, ch. 179, B misdemeanor, except as provided in Section 
I 8. 76-10-1309" for "class C misdemeanor* at the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- end of Subjection (2). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. Id. — 63AAm. Jur. 2d Prostitution C<J«S. — 73 CJ£ Prostitution ( 4. 
i 12. Key Numbers. — Prostitution ^ 1. 
76-10-1304. Aiding prostitution. 
(1) A person is guilty of aiding prostitution if he: 
(a) solicits a person to patronize a prostitute; 
(b) procures or attempts to procure a prostitute for a patron; 
(c) leases or otherwise permits a place controlled by the actor, alone or 
in association with another, to be used for prostitution or the promotion of 
prostitution; or 
(d) solicits, receives, or agrees to receive any benefit for doing any of the 
acts prohibited by this subsection. 
(2) Aiding prostitution is a class B misdemeanor. However, a person who is 
eonvicted a second time, and on all subsequent convictions, under this section 
or under a local ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 76-10-1307 is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1*55, 7S40-1804, enacted by tion (2), which formerly resd "Aiding prostitu-
I* 1*73, ch. I t s , I 7S.10.1304; 1*74, ch. *2, ticm is a claw B misdemssnor, provided thst s 
I **; 1*91, ch. 107,1 t . second conviction under this section shell be s 
Amendment Notes. — The 1*91 emend- class A misdemeanor." 
men!, afsc^vs April 29, J£9J, mmte Subset* 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Completion. 
Completion Crime of psndering waswoomplet* when per* 
Entrapment 8 0 D t D c o u r 1 * ^ female person to become pros* 
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address of the defendant that appears on any material exhibited or 
distributed, and if no address appears, then the last known address of the 
defendant; and 
(b) the prosecuting attorney's affidavit of compliance with the provi-
sions of this subsection are attached to the summons. The Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code shall keep a record of all the process 
served upon it under this section, showing the day and hour of the service. 
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the operation of Rule 
17(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(8) This section shall not be construed in any way to limit the district courts 
in the exercise of their jurisdiction under any other provision of law. 
History: C. 1953, 7S-10-1S09, enacted by ment by ch. 28, effective May 1, 1995, substi-
L. 1977, ch. 92, | 9; 1994, ch. 96,1 901; 1984 tuted -Section 63-38-3.2" for "Subsection 63-38-
(Ind &&), ch- IS, | 1SS; 1995, eh. IS, | 65. 3(2)" in Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
76-10-1211. Separability clause. 
If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this part or its application to 
any person or circumstance shall for any reason be adjudged by any court of 
competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the judgment shall not affect, impair, or 
invalidate the remainder of thi6 part or its application to other persons or 
circumstances but shall be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence, 
paragraph, persons, or circumstances, or part thereof directly involved in the 
controversy in which the judgment shall have been rendered. 
History: C. 195S, 79-10*1211, enacted by Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amend-
L. 1973, eh, 196, f 79-10-1911$ 1995, ch, 90, ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted 'this 
I 144. part" for "this set" in two places. 
76-10-1229.5. Breast feeding is not violation of this part. 
A woman's breast feeding, including breast feeding in any location where the 
woman otherwise may rightfully be, does not under any circumstance consti-
tute a violation of this part, irrespective of whether or not the breast is covered 
during or incidental to feeding. 
History: C. IMS, 76-10-1229.5, enacted by became effective on Msy 1, 1995, pursuant to 
L. 1995, cb, 131, f 5. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. - Lewi 1995, cb. 131 
PARTIS 
PROSTITUTION 
76-10-1305. Exploiting prostitution. 
(1) A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he: 
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a house of 
prostitution for one who would be an inmate; 
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to 
become or remain a prostitute; 
(c) transports a person into or within this state with a purpose to 
promote that person's engaging in prostitution or procuring or paying for 
transportation with that purpose; 
76-10-1401 CRIMINAL CODE 108 
(d) not being a child or legal defendant of a proetitute, ahares the 
proceeds of prostitution with a proetitute pursuant to their understanding 
that he if to share therein; or 
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, alone or in 
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution busi-
ness. 
(2) Exploiting prostitution is a felony of the third degree. 
History: C. 1955, 78-10-180&, enacted by Amendment Note*. - Hie 1996 amend-
L. 1978, eh, 196, f 7*10-1906; 1974, eh- 82, meat, effective April 99, 1996, made stylistic 
• SO; 1996, ch- 79, | 102. changes throughout SubeectioD (1). 
PART 14 
REPEALER [REPEALED] 
76-10-1401- Repealed. 
Repeal*. - Lewi 1996, ch. 79,1116 repeali the former Title 76 and parte of former Title 77 
176-10-140, a* enacted by Lews 1973, ch 196, of the Utah Cede, effective April 29,1996. 
I 76-10-1401, which provided for the repeal of 
PART 16 
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES 
76-10-1602. Definitions. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Unlawful ectfrity. Helhrook ?. Mailer Protection Corp., 883 R2d 
Improper payment of eommiaaioni if not tec- 295 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
agnized in this etatute at an unlawful activity. 
76-10-1603. Unlawful acts. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Element! recognised in the etatute as an unlawful actrv-
Claim ef racketeering that was net pleaded tty, wai property dismissed, and defendant waa 
with particularity sufficient to establish a pat- entitled to the award ef ita attorney fees. 
tare of unlawful activity, and that alleged to- . Holbrook •. Master Protection Corp., 883 R2d 
proper payment ef eomxnissions, which la net 195 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) 
77-7-15 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
burden to show reasonable and probable cause 
for believing itemt offered for sale bad been 
unlawfully taken by the detained or arretted 
person; this taction in essence codifies the pre-
existing common law defenae of probable eauae 
to effect an arrest and expands it to incorporate 
specific private persons in the shoplifting con-
text. Tbrry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst, 605 
P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). 
Bvidenoe of prior ooavietion. 
Where customer sued merchant for malicious 
proeecution, false arrest and Ukt imprison* 
fluent arising from alleged shoplifting incident 
and introduced evidence the incident left her 
severely depressed and euiodal, merchant 
which wished to introduce evidence of s prior 
shoplifting conviction and its surrounding facts 
as affecting the issue of damages was properly 
restricted to showing fact of the prior act and 
the identity of the party involved in view of, 
inter alis. the similarity of the incidents and 
substantia! likelihood of confusing the jury. 
Iferry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst, 605 P.2d 
314 (Utah 1979). 
liability. 
—Acquittal 
Store that had probable cause to detain sus-
pected shoplifter's sister was not liable for false 
arrest even though sister was subsequently 
acquitted of shoplifting charge. Davis v. Zions 
Co-op. Mercantile Inst, 29 Utah 2d 336, 509 
P.2d 362 (1973). 
Motive for arrest 
Section offered no civil immunity to a mer-
chant who initiated a customers arrest for 
purpose of effecting a civil remedy to collect 
money owed, even if the money was lawfully 
owed; thus section did not shield auto dealer 
from liability for false imprisonment where 
customer drove eway in new truck after leaving 
chock for less than purchase price dealer was 
demanding and dealer called police and asked 
thst truck be picked up, saying there had been 
a theft. Greenwell v. Canyon Lincoln Mercury, 
Inc., 676 R2d 663 (Utah 1973). 
Probable oauae. 
-Speci f ic case*. 
There was sufficient evidence upon which to 
base a Jury verdict denying damages for false 
arrest, where plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old 
motorcycle rider, had placed a small article of 
merchandise in his helmet, justifying a reason-
able suspicion that he was shoplifting. Fuller v. 
Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 633 P.2d 1036 (Utah 
1975). 
—Standard 
Tht standard applicable to detentions and 
arrests by merchants u composed of both sub-
jective and objective elements; the merchant 
must allege and prove not only that he believed 
is good faith that his conduct was lawful, but 
also that his belief was reasonable; even if the 
crime was not in foot being committed or at-
tempted, if the merchant in good faith believes 
that such facts are present as to lead him to an 
honest conclusion that a crime is being commit-
ted by the person to be arrested then he msy 
sot be held liable for false arrest. In determin-
ing the reasonableness of the conclusion, the 
test to be applied is one that is practical under 
the circumstances, Le., whether a reasonable 
end prudent man in his position would be 
justified in believing facta which would warrant 
making the arrest Ifcrry v. Zions Co-op. Mer-
cantile Inst, 605 R2d 314 (Utah 1979). 
CCLIATERAXREI^ERENCES 
Am. Jur. Sd.—32 Am. Jur. 2d False Impris-
onment f { 44 et aeq., 66. 
GJJS. — 36 CJJB. False Imprisonment 
U 14,21 to 26,40(4) to (7). 
AXJL — Defamation: actionability of accu-
sation or imputation of shoplifting, 29 AXJL3d 
961. 
Admissibility of defendant's rules or instruc-
tions for dealing with shoplifters to action for 
false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, 
81AXJL3d705. 
Construction and effect in false imprison-
ment action of statute providing for detention 
of suspected shoplifters, 47 AUFUd 996. 
Changing the price tags by patron in self-
service store as criminal offense, 60 AXJL3d 
1293. 
Key Number*. —False Imprisonment *> 2, 
10,13,16. 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect — Grounds. 
A peace of&cer may stop any person in a public place when be hag a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing 
6S0 
ABREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE 77-7-15 
or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
History: C. 1958, 77-7-16, enacted by L. 
1*80, eh. 15,1 8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Alcohol nee by minor. 
Avoiding roadblock. 
Basis of suspicion. 
Court's findings. 
Drug use. 
No reasonable suspicion. 
Out-of-state licenses. 
Prostitution. 
Revoked lioense. 
Standard. 
Suspected shoplifting. 
Vehicles. 
Cited. 
Alcohol use by minor. 
Defendant's young appearance and the smell 
of aloohol on defendant*! breath gave police 
officer a reasonable articulable suspicion,, based 
on objective evidence, that the defendant had 
consumed alcohol and was a minor. State v. 
Bean, 669 P.2d 964 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
Avoiding roadblock. 
Avoiding a roadblock, even assuming its le-
gality, without more, does not create an 
articulable suspicion that the occupants have 
engaged in or are about to engage in criminal 
activity. The act merely demonstrates a desire 
to avoid police confrontation, and at bast only 
gives rise to a hunch that criminal activity may 
be afoot Sute v. Iklbot, 792 R2d 469 (Utah Ct 
App. 1990). 
Basis of suspicion. 
The reasonable, articulable suspicion con-
templated in this section must be based on 
objective feet* suggesting that the individual 
may be involved in criminal activity. State v. 
Menke, 767 R2d 537 (Utah Ct App. 1990). 
In order to conclude that there was raaaon-
able suspicion to justify stopping defendant, an 
officer must be able to articulate some unlawful 
or suspicious behavior connecting the detainee 
to the suspected criminal activity. State v. Pot-
ter, 663 R3d 40 (Utah Ct App. 1993). 
When a reliable source with reasonable sus-
picion baaed en articulable tacts reports the 
eommission ef a crime and, baaed on the re-
layed frets, the dispatcher eemmusicstss the 
information to the police, and the responding 
officer's own observations corroborate the dis-
patch, reasonable suspicion exists far a atop. 
SUte v. Both, 627 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
Court's findings. 
Trial court %md in ruling that a city police 
officer had a reasonable suspicion to justify 
seizing defendant, who was seen emerging from 
a 24-hour grocery store at 3:30 a.m., where the 
eourt made only a conclueory finding that de-
fendant's answers to questions regarding the 
ownership of a vehicle in the store parking lot 
were •inconsistent, vague and suspicious." 
SUte v. Munsen, 621 R2d 13 (Utah Ct App. 
1991). 
Drug use. 
When an officer aaw defendant smoking a 
cigarette, which from her training and experi-
ence she recognised as a marijuana •joint," 
while the defendant was in s vacant parking lot 
in hii vehicle with the windows rolled up on a 
warm day, even though the defendant's sctivity 
was conceivably consistent with innocent activ-
ity! it was strongly indicative of criminal activ-
ity and the officer had reasonable grounds to 
stop the vehicle and investigste further. Provo 
City Corp. v. Spotts, 661 P.2d 437 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
No reasonable suspicion. 
Where suspects were detained on the basis of 
a description by a fellow officer who had seen 
them walking in the vicinity of a burglary, and 
where the suspects were not observed at the 
ecene of the crime, or engaging in unlawful or 
suspicious activity, the ''reasonable suspicion" 
test was not met 8tate v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 
716 (Utah 1965). 
Detention of defendant on e city street st 
6:30 iLm. was unreasonable where the initial 
decision to stop was based merely on the lete-
sees of the hour and the high-crime factor in 
the area, and defendant's "nervous" conduct 
was consistent with innocent as well es with 
criminal behavior. Sute v. Thtfillo, 769 P.2d 65 
(Utah Ct App. 1967). 
Seizure of defendant's eutomobile was in-
valid, where his initial stop for driving in the 
left lane had been used as a pretext to support 
the arresting officer's "hunch* that defendant 
was engaged in illegal activity. Sute v. Sierra, 
764 R2d 972 (Utah Ct App. 1966). 
No reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
See 8UU v. Scry, 766 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct App. 
1966). 
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